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Abstract: 
The discourse associated with the .making of post-communist capitalism is 
based in part on the conjunction of entrepreneurship and expertise. In this paper, 
we examine one variation on this theme: a systematic effort to bring Western 
business expertise directly to Polish entrepreneurs. While it might be called a 
transfer of "technical assistance", this encounter between Western business 
experts and Polish entrepreneurs also generates a more profound cultural 
transformation of business practices that calls into question the neutral technical 
image normally associated with expertise. Instead, this assistance should be 
understood additionally as a kind of missionary work aimed a t  the empowerment 
of a small class of Polish citizens whose leadership, the experts believe, is essential 
to making post-communist capitalism possible. 
ENTREPRENEURS AND EXPERTISE: 
Michael D. Kennedy and Pauline Gianoplus 
The discourse associated with the making of post-communist capitalism is 
based in part on the conjunction of entrepreneurship and expertise. In this paper, 
we examine one variation on this theme: an exemplary attempt to transmit 
business expertise directly into Polish enterprises. Our analysis is based on 
extended interviews with 19 participants in the 1990 and 1991 Michigan MBA 
Corps, one of the first assistance programs of its type.2 We use quotations from 
3 these experts on matters concerning their perceptions of Polish business 
1 The making of this paper was supported by the National Council for Soviet and East European 
Research, which however is not responsible for the contents or findings of this paper. We also 
received financial support for this research from the Center for International Business Education 
of the University of Michigan and the Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan, 
who are similarly not responsible. We are grateful to Dina Smeltz for the many interviews she 
conducted in both Poland and the USA. We also wish to express our thanks to Kate Weaver, 
Stephanie Lixie, Michael Dreiling and Theresa Deussen for their assistance in the transcriptions of 
these interviews. Pa t  Preston's editing of this paper was a s  usual extraordinarily valuable, but 
we wish to express our deep appreciation for her outstanding coordination of the grants that 
enabled this paper. Comments by Ireneusz Bialecki, J an  Szczucki and Barbara Heyns on a 
previous draft of this paper also helped refine the paper before you. A short term travel grant 
from IREX also provided support for Bialecki's attendance a t  the working seminar in which this 
paper was discussed. Subsequent comments by Katherine Verdery inspired a more critical 
interpretation of the data to be found in this version of the paper, a turn both of us appreciate. 
2 The respondents were told that they would be anonymous. Numbers following quotations refer 
to the number assigned to a particular interview that has been transcribed. In addition to interns 
from the MBA program, we have also relied on an intern from Northwestern University working 
alongside one of the University of Michigan fellows, a s  well as  an interview with the MBA Corps 
director. 
3 One reader of this paper objected that we cannot understand these interns a s  "experts", given 
that they are "only" students in an MBA program. Although they are not highly credentialed in a 
Western sense, all but two of our respondents felt that their lack of an advanced business degree 
was not an obstacle to their consulting practice. Indeed, for a variety of reasons they become 
more "expert" than many experts who report on Polish business to the West. First, they are with 
a firm longer than most Western experts who come in as  consultants; they are there generally for 
three months and not the couple weeks most Westerners remain in town. Second, they are 
generally a s  old a s  their business colleagues; most of these Polish entrepreneurs are less than 40 
competence, their contributions to their places of employment, the credentials 
which proved most effective in giving them a foot in the door, and their 
perceptions of the major obstacles to change in Polish economic reform in order to 
provide specific information concerning the accomplishments and limitations of this 
kind of program. We also elaborate the following larger analytical points. 
1) While it might be called a transfer of "technical assistance", this 
encounter between Western business experts and Polish entrepreneurs also 
generates a more profound cultural transformation of business practices that calls 
into question the neutral technical image normally associated with expertise. 
According to our informants, "mindsets" are the object of transformation as often 
as "techniques" are. We argue, therefore, that the connotations of "technical 
assistance" or "expertise" may be misleading for many Western experts going to 
Poland to provide know-how to the private sector. Making post-communist 
capitalism is not just about merging a global capitalist technique with the domestic 
entrepreneurial spirit; rather, international capitalism's techniques have a culture 
embedded in them that is as often the telos of transformation as are the 
techniques which enable this culture to have an appearance of neutrality. 
2) Although direct participation by Western experts in Polish firms is 
perceived by both Poles and Western experts to facilitate transformations of 
"mindsets", it is acceptable to both sets of actors because this cultural work 
manages to retain the connotation of neutrality associated with expert work. This 
neutrality is possible because the cultural transformation is based on the 
hierarchical valuation of business cultures in the world system. The expert's 
mindset is perceived by both Polish entrepreneur and Western expert to reflect the 
and often in their early 30's. And finally, one of the things which impressed their employers most 
was the previous experience of the MBA interns; all of them had some work experience before 
returning to get their MBA degree, and very often it was doing work for a firm or handling a 
measure of value far exceeding the worth of the Polish firm. In this sense, the MBA interns were 
as much "expert" as the firms needed. And perhaps they were more expert than was necessary. 
foundations of a su~erior  capitalist culture, not just another culture. This portrait 
of technically neutral cultural work by experts is possible then only within a 
deeper framework that portrays the Westerners' work as that of altruistic 
missionaries helping Poles realize a superior culture of business. 
3) It  is important to distinguish between the making of post-communist 
capitalist enterprises and the making of post-communist capitalism. While the 
proliferation of private business and heroic capitalists might someday lead to the 
formation of a capitalist society, our experts are generally pessimistic about the 
chances for a successful Polish macroeconomic reform in the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, they don't see the obstacles to be technical a t  all, but rather a consequence 
of the combination of a popular culture that opposes the capitalist spirit and a 
democracy which reflects this opposition. Nevertheless, they see no alternative to 
capitalism in the long run, and believe that Poles must become better capitalists 
despite themselves. For these experts, then, helping Poles who have the most 
capitalist spirit is a way of helping Poland become not only capitalist but 
democratic, even if it means struggling against the Polish popular culture in the 
short run.4 
Our paper is an interpretation of this interaction between entrepreneurship 
and expertise in Polish business. This intepretation is not based on a 
representative sample accessing an underlying Polish "reality". Instead, we are 
trying to understand how one significant effort in transmitting American business 
expertise on the job worked. We also want to know how these experts understood 
their roles in the transmission, because we believe that both the consequences of 
their efforts and the interpretations of those efforts will help shape the image of 
Polish economic reform in the West. The analysis is thus not about the problems 
4 Being without business expertise ourselves, but possessing a skeptical sociological imagination, 
we can't say whether the lack of an alternative is a consequence of limited options or equally 
limited imaginations. That is a subject for future history. 
and needs of Polish enterprises per se; it is about the experts' stories and 
interpretations of post-communist capitalism as much as it is about post- 
communist capitalism i t ~ e l f . ~  Our analysis elucidates the cultural assumptions of 
the Western experts; in doing so, we are better equipped to make sense of the 
coherence and contradictions of their assessments. Once so schematized, these 
assessments can be contrasted to claims made about Polish needs by those 
differently located in the process of transformation, for instance by those in local 
governments, enterprise councils, and so on. Our principal justification for this 
kind of research is that it is not only the needs of transition which shape the 
policies of both the West and the Polish government, but also the cultural filters 
through which assessments of those needs by experts are made. One of the most 
important cultural filters is the elevation of this conjunction of entrepreneurship 
and expertise in making post-communist capitalism. 
ENTREPRENEURS, SPIRIT AND EXPERTISE MAKING POST-COMMUNIST 
CAPITALISM 
Communists generally came to power in societies where capitalism was less 
advanced than it was in contemporary Western Europe or North America. Under 
communist rule, capitalist development was retarded as both the capitalist class 
and the spirit of capitalism were more or less destroyed. The making of post- 
communist capitalism is in large part about either making this class and spirit 
anew, or in renewing and expanding that which a society had before communism. 
Much of the discourse about making post-communist capitalism tends, however, to 
5 I t  is important to note here that the realm of the economic transformation in post-communist 
Poland is dominated by men in both government agencies and individual enterprises. This paper's 
analysis reflects our interns' participation as such. Gianoplus is collecting data on the gendering 
of professions in post-communism's transformations so that the male-streaming of the process can 
be made explicit, rather than remain implicit, as it remains in the interviews and their analysis in 
this paper. 
overstate the development of both the capitalist class and spirit in pre-communist 
Eastern Europe, especially when significant parts of that class and spirit rested in 
nationalities which were destroyed in the Holocaust, such as the Jews, or which 
emigrated after World War 11, such as the ~ e r m a n s . ~  The discourse not only 
misrepresents the historical problem, but also simplifies the sociological one, as we 
argue below. 
Making post-communist capitalism often puts a t  its center the making of a 
"middle class". This "middle class" is understood as a petty bourgeois or, better, a 
bourgeois class which not only carries with it the economic rationality of a 
capitalist system, but also the liberal values of political democracy.7 After the 
collapse of communist parties, the main obstacle to making this "middle class" is 
often put in cultural terms. Increasingly, Polish social scientists and public 
intellectuals argue that the "values" of society are somehow inappropriate for 
making post-communist capitalism. Society remains too "socialist" or 
"egalitarian" in its dispositions. The spirit of capitalism is insufficiently 
widespread, and a culture of "social helplessness" predominates.8 Edmund 
6 See for instance a discussion in Tadeusz Kowalik, "Marketization and Privatization: The Polish 
Case" in -list Register, 1991, p. 259-78. 
7 John R. Guardian0 of the Heritage Foundation exemplifies this assumption in his December 12, 
1992 letter to The New York Times "Why Political Democracy Hurts Russia's Economic 
Freedom". He writes that Yeltsin must choose between economic freedom and political 
democracy, and in order to someday have the latter, he must first build the former. He bases his 
argument on the following assumption: "...stable and successful democracies such as  exist in the 
United States and Western Europe can only emerge with the development of an  entrepreneurial 
middle class. Indeed, the existence of such a class in these countries made real and sustainable 
democracy possible". Although not so explicitly stated, this assumption motivates a great deal of 
research in Eastern Europe. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska and Andrzej Rychard have focused much of 
their work on this issue. For an early example of their thinking, see "Economy and Polity: 
Dynamics of Change" S o c l a l e a r c h  57:2:(1990):303-20. Ivan Szelenyi has offered a more 
critical assessment than most commentators, however, when he wrote that "Socialist 
embourgeoisment also produces entrepreneurs who, contrary to the expectations of dissident 
ideologues are more 'bourgeois' and les 'citoyen' than petty commodity producers in Western 
societies. These socialist entrepreneurs have much of the greediness of the capitalists and little of 
the civic consciousness of the urban burgher" Socialist Entre- University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1988, p. 213. 
Mokrzycki has most recently argued that such a collective sense has helped to 
generate a "neo-socialist" utopia that motivates collective action, especially in the 
large state-owned enterprises in Poland. 9 
With this opposition between a "socialist society" and a nascent "capitalist 
middle class", we have two contending spirits or cultures representing different 
systems of political economy: the conflict between the spirits of socialism and of 
capitalism. This spirit of capitalism in post-communist countries, however, is a 
different than the one with which we are most familiar. 
The most famous "spirit of capitalism" is associated with Max Weber. For 
Weber, the spirit of capitalism differed dramatically from the spirit that prevailed 
in previous eras. In European feudal society, for instance, the quest for profit, the 
lust for gain, was as prevalent as it is in capitalism. The difference is that it was 
viewed as sinful, and thus was never developed into the rational, calculating and 
systematic enterprise it became with capitalists. Weber writes, 
it is one of the fundamental characteristics of an individualistic capitalistic 
economy that it is rationalized on the basis of rigorous calculation, directed 
with foresight and caution toward the economic success which is sought in 
sharp contrast to the hand-to-mouth existence of the peasant, and to the 
privileged traditionalism of the guild craftsman and of the adventurers' 
capitalism, oriented tolp exploitation of political opportunities and 
irrational speculation. 
8 During the past several years, much of Polish social scientific research has been dedicated to 
demonstrating the inadequacy of Poles' orientations toward motivation and work. One of the 
earlier and best elaborators of this problem is Mira Marody. See "Social Stability and the Concept 
of Collective Sense" in Jadwiga Koralewicz, Ireneusz Bialecki and Margaret Watson (eds.) Crisis 
and Transition: Polish Societv in the 1980's St Martins Press, 1987. In this framework, Poles 
are not inclined to help themselves out of their own crisis, and more likely to look to politics or the 
state to resolve their own economic misfortunes. It  is important to note that this approach enables 
its advocate to locate problems squarely on the shoulders of those who are its most obvious 
victims. This problematic of victim blaming is quite different in Poland of course because it 
extends to most of the society rather than just to an underclass as  it did in the poverty debate in 
the USA; in fact, the "learned helplessness" argument it might even be applied to entrepreneurs, 
the harbingers of Poland's capitalist future. 
9 "The Vicious Circle of Utopias in Eastern Europe", a paper presented a t  the conference 
"Utopian Revisions: Nationalism and Civil Society in Eastern Europe", Institute for the 
Humanities, the University of Michigan, October 29-30, 1992. 
Formal rationality involves the maximization of several principles including 
calculability and predictability. Because the capitalist spirit is identified with the 
systematic and calculated pursuit of more and more wealth, it is an example of the 
rationalization of spirit, the rationalization of economic culture itself. 
The entrepreneurial spirit associated with the burgeoning middle class of 
post-communism also opposes the prevailing spirit of the past system. .But 
because the former communist-led system was different from the feudal one in 
important ways, the spirit of this anti-systemic capitalism is also different. 
Consider, for instance, the way in which Ivan Szelenyi describes the 
entrepreneurial spirit in Socialist Entrepreneurs, his book on Hungary's 
"interrupted embourgeoisment": 
Values and ideals, particularly those related to autonomy and risk 
taking, resistance to being subordinated to the bureaucratic order and 
to accepting ascribed ranks in a hierarchy, desire to be one's own 
boss, value at t  hed to hard work, and willingness to delay 
consumption.. . BE 
While of course there are important similarities between Weber's "spirit of 
capitalism" and Szelenyi's "entrepreneurial spirit", the distinction is startling. 
Weber emphasizes the rational and calculating element in the pursuit of profit as 
capitalism's spirit, while Szelenyi emphasizes the anti-bureaucratic self-reliant 
side. The difference, of course, lies in how the "ancien' regime" of each society is 
opposed to the ideal typical capitalist spirit. 
In feudalism, merchants were subordinated to an aristocratic ethos; in 
Soviet-type society, merchants were oppressed by a bureaucratic planned economy. 
In the former, the acquisition of the capitalist spirit was seen as a cultural 
transformation of the merchant class, undermining the old goals of leisure and 
. . . . 
10 See Max Weber, The Prok&ant Ethic and the Splrit of Cap&dmaNew York: Scribners, 
1958, p. 76.. 
. . 
11 See Ivan Szelenyi, &m&st E-eneurs: Em- in Rural Hunsarv. University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1988, p. 65. 
consumption in the accumulation of wealth, to be replaced by the planned 
systematic accumulation of wealth for its own sake. For Weber, it was not just a 
matter of political economic transformation, the rise of a class to power; it was 
also about a transformation of the culture of the merchant class that made 
capitalism. For most theorists of post-communist capitalism, however, there is 
little explicit emphasis on the cultural transformation of its middle class. 
The discourse of making post-communist capitalism shares much with 
accounts of post-communism's ethnic conflicts. The latter are often explained with 
reference to taking the communist lid off the cauldron of irredentist nationalist 
cultures. Likewise, by taking the communist lid off of the capitalist spirit, a 
"middle" or aspiring capitalist class should flourish in Poland. One merely needs 
to unleash the capitalist spirit by exhuming it from its bureaucratic burial. Such 
an image is possible because an entrepreneurial spirit of risk taking, profit- 
making, opportunity seeking and innovation is perceived to be aplenty in Poland. 
But this spirit does not incorporate in its discourse the technical exactitudes of 
Weber's rational capitalists. This is where "technical assistance" becomes an 
important part of the post-communist capitalist project. 
International organizations, the states of leading capitalist powers and 
various private agencies have sought to provide "technical assistance" to post- 
communist societies. In the first years after communism's collapse, this assistance 
was especially forthcoming when that society's political leadership claimed to be 
moving as quickly as possible toward building a capitalist economy. Technical 
assistance has come in many guises, from the kind of advice that the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development provides to those implementing 
macroeconomic reforms to the kind of effort we analyze in this paper. 
Despite their differences, all of these forms of technical assistance have a 
common cultural claim built into them: that the West has a superior form of 
knowledge which, when provided to post-communist countries, can facilitate the 
"transition to democratic capitalism". We call that superior form of specialized 
knowledge "expertise".12 Of all the forms of expertise the West might claim, its 
claim to own a superior business expertise is most convincing given the power and 
influence of private business in the West, and the weakness of domestic large 
private capital in post-communist countries. 
While the discourse of advanced capitalist countries emphasizes the 
technical core of competence in the rhetoric of expertise, their assistance to post- 
communist countries does not necessarily reflect this elevation of the technical. In 
the name of technical assistance to Polish enterprises, the central "expertise" 
provided by business consultants rests on the putative rationalization of a broader 
business culture, providing general concepts and worldviews associated with a 
superior business culture. It does not come in the provision of specific techniques 
or know-how. In this sense, the threshold for an American being identified as a 
12 .  Some might object to the use of "expertise" in this context for a variety of reasons. After all, 
the way in which "expertise" is used in the discourse describing the provision of technical 
assistance to post-communist capitalism is different from the way in which expertise is used in 
discussions of the organization of knowledge in advanced capitalism. In the latter, expertise is 
associated with certain core technical ideas whose relative efficacy has been verified by the lessons 
of repeated trial and error by expert practitioners.See for instance Elliot Freidson, Profejaand 
Profess' Powers, New York University Press, 1985; or Andrew Abbott, The Svstem of lo= 
University of Chicago Press, 1988. The "expertise" being exported to post-communist capitalism 
is not so "acultural" as  many professionals claim the technical core of their knowledge to be. The 
"techniques" of Western business experts in Eastern Europe are obviously associated with 
"foreign" cultures, even though these techniques are perceived by most East Europeans and 
Western business experts alike to be neutral knowledge. Our point here, that cultural elements 
are inextricably embedded in the technical cores of all expert knowledge, has been demonstrated 
marvelously by feminist theorists in their deconstructions of scientific theories. See for instance . . 
the following publications by Sandra G. Harding: The Science Q w t i o n  in Feminism Ithaca: . . 
Cornell University Press, 1986; Sex and Scientific Inquiry, University of Chicago Press, 1987; 
Whose Science? Thinkin from Women's Lives Cornell, 1991; see also these by Evelyn Fox Keller, 
"Women Scientists and Feminist Critics of Science" D a e d a h  116(1987):77-99 and bflections on 
Gender and Science Yale University Press, 1985 Another criticism of the identification of 
technical assistance as  expertise comes with the argument that expertise demands demonstrated 
competence. A tried and true solution to the problems facing post-communist capitalism is based 
on the assumption that the competencies developed in an advanced capitalist social environment 
are applicable to a post-communist one, which only a future history might be able to assess. Our 
MBA's suggest that if capitalism is to fail, it is because domestic actors fail to follow Western 
advice by failing to become sufficiently capitalist. 
"business expert" in Poland is much lower than in the USA. Expertise is also 
more general: relevant expertise in the USA requires far greater specialization of 
knowledge than relevant expertise in contemporary Polish business practices. The 
most important expertise to be transmitted to Polish business enterprise, according 
to the Western experts, is a general business culture taken for granted in the 
West. While this culture has many elements, much of it resembles the ideal 
typical capitalist spirit in Weber's portrait: that of a systematic, calculating and 
rational culture. 
Weber's "spirit of capitalism", which combined the effective attitude with 
the right technical components among those Calvinist capitalists, is split in the 
discourse of post-communist capitalism: the domestic entrepreneurial class 
possesses the entrepreneurial spirit, while the international or Western business 
class holds the rational culture in which technical expertise is embedded. Given 
this split, the presumption of technical assistance is that the West can teach Polish 
entrepreneurs to become more competent capitalists. There are several ways in 
which this might be done. 
EXPERTISE TRANSMITTED ON THE JOB: 
THE MBA CORPS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
In 1991, Polish officials associated with higher education believed that it 
was very important to transform the curricula of higher education.13 There has 
been considerable debate over the best way to do this in the case of business 
education. That is should change come from within established institutions of 
higher learning, from new institutions of higher learning or from more informal 
programs instructing business expertise? Most actors recognized two barriers to 
13 See Michael D. Kennedy, "National and International Factors in the Construction of 
Expertise", a paper presented a t  the Annual Meeting of the Hungarian Sociological Association, 
1991. 
effective educational reform: resistance from old tenured faculty who were 
incompetent for the new era and the absence of competent faculty for teaching the 
new business courses. While there are a number of ways in which one might 
surmount these barriers in higher education, one strategy is to avoid formal higher 
education altogether and teach business on the job. 
The University of Michigan Business School was unlike many of its Western 
counterparts who were rushing to help new business schools and programs get 
started. Although in 1992 they were planning to talk about exchanges with some 
universities, between 1989 and 1991 they didn't think it was a good idea. In the 
words of one of its officials, 
We had avoided the educational institutions because frankly, they're 
not dependable. That's what it comes down to. It's hard to find 
dependable people in companies, (and) the government, forget it.. . 
The educational institutions we visited were a series of economic 
academies and some university people ... and we came to the 
conclusion that we weren't ready, they weren't ... People were saying 
the right words, ... but you know, they really didn't understand 
(reform) and in many cases (they) didn't want to understand it (#21). 
The Michigan business school thus took a different path and formed the 
MBA Corps in 1990. The concept emerged from a few meetings of university 
personnel, who in 1989 and 1990 came up with the idea to "send some young 
experienced MBA's over there to provide management assistance" (#21). 
Participation in the University of Michigan "MBA Corps" was not the only 
way to get an internship in Polish enterprises. In 1991, the United States Peace 
Corps and the International Executive Service Corps were placing both young and 
retired business people into Polish fnms. Individual faculty arranged internships 
for their students in various settings. Kevin MacDonald, head of the Warsaw- 
based International Task Force for Company Assistance and an associate of the 
prominent Harvard economist Jeffery Sachs, literally recruited students from the 
top US business schools to work for him in the summers assessing potential 
profitability of Polish firms. The University of North Carolina a t  Chapel Hill was 
the home site for a consortium of schools which placed graduates of MBA 
programs in various enterprises in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia for one- 
and two-year stints starting in September 1991 . l~  The Michigan program, 
however, was the only program in 1990 and 1991 designed to place business 
students in Polish enterprises for three-month summer internships. It was thus 
the first organized effort to offer direct expert help to Polish firms for extended 
periods of time. 
In the summer of 1990, nine students from the Michigan MBA program 
were placed in Polish enterprises, and in 1991 sixteen internships were 
established. In the summer of 1992, twenty-five students went to Poland through 
this program, and two students to Russia. There are plans to expand this business 
assistance to Ukraine, perhaps Czechoslovakia, and also beyond the post- 
communist world, to Southern Africa, urban America and Native American 
reservations in the USA. The principal goal of the Polish program, as presumably 
it would be in the other programs, is to "providing a unique, professional 
experience to our MBA" (#21), but in the process they are assuming that they will 
assist businesses with a concomitant aim of helping local economies. 
The Michigan business corps program began in Poland for two reasons. 
First, Poland moved the most rapidly of all the post-communist economies toward 
a market economy with its shock therapy implemented in January 1990. "Polish 
managers and consumers had to respond to market mechanisms ... and they were 
in need of people who had some experience, who knew how to respond in a 
market-type environment" (#21). At the same time, Michigan had a range of 
people on its faculty with special Polish expertise; most important, the director of 
the MBA Corps was himself previously involved in Polish affairs, having been a 
publisher of a Polish journal in the USA. This gave him important contacts with 
14 In a subsequent paper, we shall compare the Michigan and UNC programs. 
members of the Polish democratic opposition from the 1980's. Using these 
contacts, he was able to find places for nine interns between March and May of 
1990, for a June departure. Internships have moved beyond this initial network, 
and now placements are arranged through local Chambers of Commerce, local 
industrial societies and a few provincial governors. 
Appointments for 1990, 1991 and 1992 are summarized in Table 1 
according to firm ownership, size, principal activity (or firm type), location and 
number of appointments. Fractions of appointment indicate that a single person 
worked in that firm during part of their summer employment. Although the Table 
provides data on all three years, in the discussion below we shall refer only to the 
years 1990 and 1991, because it is the interviews with interns from those years 
which constitute the data for this paper. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Most of the internships were in relatively small firms, employing less than 
50 people. This is related to the fact that most of the intern placements have been 
with private enterprises, although some interns have worked in state firms. The 
Corps director maintained that while private companies can generally make better 
use of the interns, some of the students should work in the state enterprises since 
most of Polish industry is still state-owned. One site in government itself was 
selected: the Ministry of Privatization. It was an unusual appointment, but "it 
was a very lean, young group of people ... twenty-five people in that office without 
any bureaucratic structures on it. ... Other than that, we have avoided 
government ministries" (#21). Interns are no longer placed in that ministry, 
especially as it has become a large bureaucracy. 
Banks became important outlets only in 1991 because it was only during 
this year that private banks were beginning to open up. Consulting firms have 
provided the greatest diversity of experiences, and oftentimes present the students 
with the most challenging tasks and problems. They also have not provided the 
most constant or steady positions. Sometimes interns a t  consulting firms work 
with a single organization that has hired the consulting firm, or they analyze the 
potential profitability of a range of firms under contract to the Polish government. 
There have been a few instances, mostly in state companies, when appointments 
don't work out because the principal employer does not have enough for the 
interns to do, in which case they will go work for another firm. Successful 
internships sometimes led to appointments in following years. Three places of 
employment have received internships in all three years: a consulting firm in 
Gdansk, a computer sales firm in Krakow and a consulting firm in Warsaw. The 
appointments have been clustered around Poland's more developed areas and its 
leading cities. Nearly three fourths of the appointments were around Warsaw, 
Krakow, and Gdansk, reflecting the initial networks of associates upon which the 
program was built, and the sites of the most accessible business activity. 
Support for this program transmitting business expertise comes from the 
University of Michigan, the United States Department of Education, and the 
Polish firms themselves. The University of Michigan, through direct alumni 
support (providing about one-half of the total costs), corporate funding (about one- 
sixth), the University's Center for International Business Education, and a variety 
of other sources, provided stipends for most of the interns. Some students (four in 
1990 and in 1991, six in 1992) received $1,100 for the entire summer; other 
students received a $1,500 per month stipend and round trip air transportation 
(five in 1990, eleven in 1991 and seventeen in 1992). Although non-Polish sources 
therefore provide for much of the costs, each host Polish firm must pay something 
for the consultant. In most cases, the room and board for the students, plus an 
occasional $25 per diem, were provided by the host enterprises. In 1991, this was 
the total compensation received by two interns, and in 1992, the total received by 
three. The full package, however, was nowhere close to that which most 
respondents felt their value to be on the international market: about $60,000 
annually. It seems, then, that these Polish firms received a form of technical 
business assistance that they could never afford on an open world market. 
The administration of the Michigan program is supported by the US 
Department of Education's Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary 
Education, providing $105,000 per year for three years of training and 
administrative costs. Part of this money goes through the University's Center for 
Russian and East European Studies which provides a training course in May of 
each year. Future interns are given a three-week intensive course in Polish 
language, history, culture, economics, politics and society. This makes them 
rather unusual for most foreign business experts. Most experts are either emigres, 
. - returning with more or less sufficient language and cultural background, or are 
completely ignorant of the Polish context, coming in without any language or 
cultural training. Many from the MBA Corps, while lamenting the problem of 
language barriers in their work, found that their minimal training enabled them to 
participate more fully than many of their fellow outsiders. 
This language barrier is an important issue affecting the transmission of 
expertise, however. It generally means that free communication is possible only 
with those who speak English. And although English is the language of 
international business, and many of the ambitious and competent Polish managers 
speak English, interns are limited in their contacts to people who are relatively 
well educated and oriented to English speaking countries. Some of the interns are 
provided translators, but even with translators most of their contacts remain with 
a particular, rather elite group of people. Even if this elite this group leads Poland 
through economic reform, as most of our interns think, it does not represent a 
broader Polish sentiment on business and economic reform. Instead, the 
dispositions of this group of entrepreneurs are probably more akin to the anti- 
socialist dispositions of Solidarity deputies in the 1989-91 parliaments or to 
students in Warsaw's programs on business education than they are similar to the 
more egalitarian mainstream of Polish society.15 But while it must be kept in 
mind that these interns' experiences and evaluations are severely constrained by 
language and contacts, their contacts are broader and more extended than many 
so-called Western "experts" who tell Poland and the West what is needed for 
reform to succeed in post-communist countries. 
The perceptions of our American experts are also influenced by other 
important factors. Our respondents are all white,16 between 25 and 35 years old, 
and for the most part male. Additionally, the MBA Corps interns are not working 
in a random sample of Polish enterprises, and thus their experiences are skewed 
on the basis of their appointments. As we have discussed, appointments are biased 
toward the private sector; although a majority of the Polish economy is still 
comprised of state owned companies, more than 70% of the 1990-91 interns were 
placed in private firms. This fact is in keeping with Polish and American 
sentiment that private companies are the salvation of Polish reform. Second, 
interns are typically not located in heavy manufacturing enterprises, but rather in 
firms which are more service oriented, such as retail stores and 
distributors/producers, consulting firms and banks. Third, most of the 
15 See the other papers prepared for our grant from the National Council for Soviet and East 
European Research: Ireneusz Bialecki and Bogdan Mach, "The Social and Economic Orientations 
of Polish Legislators against a Background of the Views of Polish Society" and Barbara Heyns and 
Jan  Szczucki, "Educating Entrepreneurs: The New Polish Business Schools". 
16 One African American male participated in the 1991 exchange, although he was not 
interviewed. 
appointments are in major urban centers in the most developed parts of Poland, 
especially in Warsaw, Krakow and Gdansk. Finally, the Corps director made 
every effort to place the interns in businesses with good, honest- managers who 
might use the interns effectively. In this effort, we presumably have interns 
working with a more competent class of Polish entrepreneur than would be typical. 
Therefore, the portrait of Polish business competence we are about to report 
should be more optimistic than a "representative" sample would have it. At the 
same time, it might represent the best prospects for a politically liberal capitalist 
class in the future. 
Not only is the placement designed to maximize a positive interpretation of 
post-communist capitalism's chances, but the explicit cultural model of the 
program is so implicated. The "MBA Corps" is a direct imitation of the Peace 
Corps started by President John F. Kennedy. In public presentations describing 
the Corps, the Business School Dean associated with the program described the 
"spirit" of the interns in much the same way as he imagined the Peace Corps 
volunteers of the 1960's. He portrayed these interns as altruistic and idealistic 
students, somewhat like capitalist missionaries, bringing the benefits of a more 
advanced and civilized way of life to a primitive world of business. Thus, the 
formation of the MBA Corps was based in part on the inspiration of a previous 
program of secular missionaries who promised to bring technical competence and 
the fruits of the developed world to developing societies. This time, however, these 
are more explicitly capitalist missionaries, bringing business techniques to 
aspiring, if primitive, entrepreneurs. 
Although the interns never referred to themselves as missionaries, and 
never cast the MBA Corps in the shadow of the Peace Corps, these Western 
experts never failed to give the impression they were bringing wisdom to Poland, 
and not the other way around. When we asked what they learned in Poland, their 
responses always compared poorly with what they told us about their 
contributions to their enterprise. They might have learned about character or the 
evils of communism, but they never mentioned any kind of knowledge which might 
be useful for improving their own business practices, or making the West a better 
place to live. Even when some lauded the depth of friendship and family ties in 
Poland, they tended to understand it as a thing of the past, difficult to preserve in 
the advanced kind of capitalism toward which Poland had to move. With this 
clear imagery of advanced and primitive built into their models of action, it is not 
surprising that our question about business competence would evoke a powerful 
response. 
POLISH BUSINESS COMPETENCE 
One of the questions we asked of these MBA interns was this: "Are there 
any Poles who stick out in your mind as being exceptional business people?". A 
significant minority (six) said either no, or mentioned some people but emphasized 
the qualities which made them inadequate. For instance, #5 mentioned a woman 
university professor who had "tremendous potential that was untapped" and 
another bank president who "was pretty good, although sometimes I think he has 
a burning desire to do something good for his country and that clouds his 
judgment". Another (#7) found those who made their first million illegally to be 
the most "exceptional". 
Most interns could respond without hesitation to this question, and recall a 
name with an immediate justification as to why the person was exceptional. 
Invariably, these people were top executives of firms, except in one case where an 
intern mentioned a Polish intern that spoke six languages and was studying in 
Japan. The qualities that the American interns admired were typically character 
attributes rather than a specific business competence. They were "visionaries", or 
they were "very motivated", or "entrepreneurial". They either had some kind of 
gut instinct for the market, or they shared the same world view as the interns. 
Frequently, those who worked with Polish consultants found them to be of like 
mind, although they may not have had the same "intensity" as their American 
counterparts (#16). The international sophistication of the entrepreneur was 
mentioned rarely, but #8 found the management of a firm manufacturing diesel 
engines for the West to be impressive because their "mindset" was "to make 
customers happy," and #16 found-something similar in a company manufacturing 
medical products. Or another (#6) was impressed by one CEO because he "was 
published in the West, and he seemed to know what was going on (in the world)". 
The academic disposition, however, was often a mark against the Polish 
entrepreneur because it was perceived by the interns to lead to a general inability 
to get the job done. 
In many firms, especially consulting firms and banks, management has 
typically come out of academia. Particularly, new managers and entrepreneurs 
have come from the economics departments and foreign trade faculties of local 
universities. In such instances, but also in others (nine times overall), managers 
are praised for knowing the "theory" of what ought to be done, but criticized for 
failing to execute the task. One intern (#7) said, "They weren't the right people to 
run a business, some of them were academic types ... they didn't know how to roll 
up their sleeves and actually manage and tell them what to do." Another (#9) 
said, "They understood all the theory. They had read all the English textbooks. 
They had just never put it into practice. So, their overall business understanding 
was fairly poor." Another trait associated with this favor for theory over practice 
was the tendency to put off decisions, as when #9 complained about long time lags 
in making decisions. 
Interns are constrained in their evaluation of business stars because of their 
places of employment and language abilities. Those working in consulting firms 
assessing the profitability of various enterprises had more opportunities to find 
successful entrepreneurs. For instance, #17 evaluated a variety of state-owned 
garment manufacturers for their export potential and found quite a range of 
managerial dispositions: 
The employees a t  (the consulting company) had an excellent 
understanding of the need for change.. . The different companies 
(making garments), we'd find that attitude to a certain, varying 
degree. Some didn't want to change and you could tell they didn't 
think the economy should be changed to a market economy and they 
weren't going to change. I mean that management just wasn't going 
to change .... Some people knew they had to change but they didn't 
know what they needed to change to; and then a few people, very few 
like the management I interviewed, knew that they had to change 
and knew what they had to change to. 
Those working in large state firms without external business contacts were 
quite unlikely to find anyone.worthy of recall. In illustrating the association 
between managerial incompetence and large enterprises, #16 noted that in one 
case the search for a manager for a large steelworks company avoided those with 
previous experience in the state-owned steel industry. Rather, they preferred to 
hire a man whose past experience lay in running a 35-person computer firm, with 
his principal qualification being that he knew how to make a profit. 
Those working in small private enterprises were quite likely to admire the 
top management. I t  was rare for an intern to recall a middle level management 
person for being "exceptional", largely because most of these firms were run quite 
directly by the top management. One American consultant in Krakow (#23) 
explained this phenomenon: "Bureaucracy has been very heavy and slow moving 
in government (enterprises). Therefore new companies have tried to strip that 
away and get down to action. So they have one guy with a lot of power. The 
organization is horizontal. They're very suspicious of bureaucracy." In only one 
instance (#3) were the abilities of middle level management lauded, but not for 
their accomplishments; rather, middle level management was celebrated only 
because its initiative was crushed by senior management. Their potential in a 
better organized firm, rather than their accomplishments, was the factor making 
them "exceptional". 
In sum, most of our business experts are likely to return to the USA with 
real heroes or near heroes in their stories about the Polish road to capitalism, and 
nearly all of them are a t  the helm of small private businesses. Their only possible 
heroes are managers or entrepreneurs, but rarely those in state industry. State 
industry has few heroes, and where they are found, they often are limited by a 
corrupt senior management. Our experts' stories are not much different, then, 
from many of the popular perceptions both in Poland and abroad, of Polish 
entrepreneurs as the motors toward a post-communist capitalism. In both cases, 
the hero of post-communist capitalism is the aspiring entrepreneurial manager. 
Where our experts' stories are better than those to be found in every mainstream 
journalist's story is in their depiction of what makes these business persons 
exceptional navigators. If technical assistance is to be of any value, we should 
learn from our experts what these entrepreneurial heroes lack, and what they 
could be taught by Western experts. 
THE CAPACITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF POLISH ENTREPRENEURS 
One of the most common limitations identified by our interns came in the 
field of human resource management. They were typically quite disappointed in 
the understandable response of many Polish entrepreneurs repulsed by decades of 
bureaucratic mismanagement in the Polish economy. For many entrepreneurs, 
the ideal organization was apparently understood as an organizational expression 
of the entrepreneurial spirit; an organization motored by hard work and individual 
initiative but laced with opposition to planning, routine, and hierarchies. This 
kind of organizational interpretation of the entrepreneurial spirit wound up 
concentrating the initiative and energy in the top management, leaving lower 
levels in a position similar to the one they found themselves in bureaucratic 
mismanagement. 
Several interns mentioned that managerial authority was wielded poorly. It 
neither created a team spirit within the firm nor encouraged employees to take 
much initiative and responsibility. The interns also thought that while the 
ostentatious displays of wealth by upper level management may have convinced 
potential customers of an owner's success as a businessman, they also drew strains 
of resentment from employees who may have been paid well by Polish standards, 
but poorly in comparison to the president (#2,20). More often, interns mentioned 
the executive's failure to delegate responsibilities and a general climate of 
disrespect for middle to lower level employees. One intern in an otherwise glowing 
report noted, "no one ever told the salespeople they were doing a good job" (#11). 
Or as another (#4) commented about his boss, 
Among a lot of people there, (there is) a great deal of dissatisfaction 
with the president ... He wasn't exactly shady, but no one ever knew 
what he was doing or where he was. He never talked to the staff or 
solicited opinions on anything. He was the quintessential kind of 
Eastern European manager where it's "this is the way we're going to 
do it." He was always very polite, but he would dictate and 
sometimes he would go crazy, and he would start running around and 
screaming about things. 
One of the competencies developed in business schools, human resource 
management, is one of the qualities least developed among the Polish business 
people with whom the interns worked. In the large state firms, middle level 
management couldn't work well, but even in the smaller firms, middle level 
management was limited, and the delegation of responsibility was virtually 
absent. If the chief executive was a good executive, this hands on management 
style was not received's0 critically; but in several instances, the authoritarian 
quality of the CEO was one of the worst characteristics of Polish managers noted 
by the interns. One of the major foci of future technical assistance within Polish 
firms ought to address improving human resource management. 
In this critique of human resource management, the job of these interns in 
the Polish firms was no different than any "general managerial consultant" 
anywhere in the world. Indeed, much of the work the interns described was 
typical consulting work. For example, they were often "sounding boards" for 
executive judgments or they were frequently responsible for organizational 
streamlining. In requiring this type of advice Polish firms don't differ from any 
Western firm which brings in a general managerial consultant, although they do 
have specific needs shaped by their context which are fundamentally different 
from countries outside the communist legacy. Specifically, the interns thought 
most Polish entrepreneurs required a change in outlook, a radical shift in 
"mindset". 
The word "mindset" was one of the interns' favorite terms to describe both 
the problems of economic reform and the orientation of the effective manager. 
Mindset is apparently narrower than "values" or "culture", for it implies an 
orientation toward a particular problem, in this case business. But a t  the same 
time it is more stable and coherent than specific orientations, for it was often 
either something the entrepreneur had or didn't have, and was very dflicult to 
instill or transform. The problem of transforming "mindsets" is nicely illustrated 
with regard to notions of production. 
Given the reputation for disorganized and shoddy production under 
communism, one would expect that the Western experts would frequently evaluate 
Polish business competence with reference to its technical and organizational 
inadequacies. Production was mentioned rarely by our interns as an area where 
their Polish colleagues were lacking knowledge. This is for a variety of reasons. 
First, and most obvious, less than 20% of the internships are in production- 
centered firms. And when interns are placed in manufacturing units, they are 
typically restricted from contact with the shopfloor by language and by their 
managerial status.17 What is more, although some of the interns had engineering 
backgrounds, none of the engineers had particular expertise in work organization, 
although a couple (#2,3) noted in their achievements that they managed to 
convince their employers to end piece rates given its negative effect on production 
of quality goods. 
Rather, the organization of production entered into interns' discussions only 
when it was linked to marketing and sales strategies, an area of "expertise" that 
we will later show is inextricably connected to the celebrated mindset which Poles 
lack. In particular, several interns (#16,17) were dismayed by otherwise 
competent entrepreneurs' notions of "capacity production". #17 recalled typical 
conversations as follows: 
"We think we can match you up with some customers and help 
increase your sales." Some of the companies would say, "Well, I'm 
already making as much as I can." Some would even say, "Why do I 
want to increase my sales, I'm doing pretty good," without even 
thinking. And then the ones that would say that I'm a t  capacity, I 
can't make any more, they would think that they were a t  capacity 
even though they were only running one or two shifts and they were 
overshipping ten percent of their products because they knew there 
was going to be some quality problem in it and twenty percent of the 
product was being worked within their system. So they really 
weren't a t  capacity if you look a t  all those factors. So they start 
talking to them about that and then, if even if you get beyond that, 
whether you think there's enough market out there to justify more 
capital investment. Those were things that they just didn't think 
about before. 
This orientation toward "capacity production" illustrates the kind of 
"mindset" the Western experts found most inconsistent with good business 
practices. The interns did not find their principal challenge to lie in the 
17 The value of Burawoy's work on the shopfloor of Hungarian and Russian firms is all the more 
apparent in this contrast. See for example Chapter 3 in Michael Burawoy and Janos Lukacs, The 
B. ad i n  a t Past: Ideolow and Reality in H_langarv7s Road To Capitalism (University of Chicago 
Press, 1992). 
introduction of a particular organization of shifts or concrete technical advice. 
Instead, they had to change the more general "mindset" of the managers 
themselves in order to get them to think directly about maximizing their profits 
and more flexibly about "capacity production". This illustrates rather well the 
inaccuracy of speaking of this internship merely as one of "technical assistance". 
Changing a mindset is vastly different from introducing a specific technical 
innovation. A "consultant" or "technical advisor" is typically one who increases 
the efficiency of realizing commonly agreed upon goals. What our experts suggest 
is that, a t  least part of the time, their principal task was to transform the goals of 
the Polish entrepreneurs. If there is a central creed to which the interns7 technical 
expertise is tied, it is "maximizing profitability". According to the interns, this 
creed was often not sufficiently central in the faith of the Polish entrepreneur. 
This is even apparent in that most "technical" 'aspect of business expertise: 
accounting. 
Of the respondents sent to work in Poland, six were accountants by 
training, but it was not only accountants who found accounting systems 
inadequate. Most found that a general accounting sensibility was missing in their 
places of employment. As #1 said, "As far as accounting-type knowledge, I found 
that it was very limited. Any type of finance. So the basic thing is to simplify it a 
lot, to show them how to do a discount or a cash flow and how to make 
predictions. And this whole idea of predicting anything in the future was to them 
impossible ... "I8 According to our experts, it was not understanding how to do a 
discount or cash flow analysis that was a problem for the Poles; rather, it was 
understanding the underlying rationale. 
18 There was some rational motivation for their resistance to using accounting records for 
financial planning. Several interns mentioned that managers had dual sets of accounting books, 
one for tax purposes and one for every day business use (#6,11). 
Polish accounting under communism used a different system, but even more 
important, it occupied a fundamentally different role in enterprise management. 
Rather than be a key tool for making decisions, accounting was more of a 
bookkeeping function designed to keep enterprise organization more or less 
consistent with planning instructions. In the new business enterprise of post- 
communist capitalism, accounting is playing a new role. 19 
The ascendance of accounting in post-communist capitalism means two 
things. First, a new system of organizing financial information is introduced that 
makes it more compatible with either West European or North American forms of 
accounting for purposes of import and export. Each firm has to make this 
technical transformation, especially when Polish enterprises are seeking ~ o i n t  
ventures with foreign investors (#11). Spread sheet computer software was one of 
the more material tools that the interns could leave that helped with the technical 
transformation of Polish business (#5,20). The interns recognized these technical 
issues to be important, but they identified a less technical but more necessary 
transformation: another change in mindset. 
The "accounting mindset" does not mean the ascendance of the certified 
public accountant to the helm of every enterprise. Rather it means that enterprise 
directors have to operate with certain very basic accounting concepts when 
deciding how to manage their enterprise. They have to know, for instance, what 
"cash flow" is, and to organize their business operations around it. For instance, 
one firm manager acted as if the delinquency of his debts from Russian customers 
was irrelevant, failing to recognize that poor cash flow can actually force an 
enterprise into bankruptcy (#19). Accounting sensibility is not only important for 
avoiding bankruptcy, but also for building a business. 
19 I t  was also a heavily feminized profession under communism, which reflected and reinforced 
its subordinate role in the enterprise. With the ascendence of accounting a s  a profession in post- 
communist capitalism, the profession's gender also should change substantially. 
The new private businesses are constructed as much along principles of anti- 
communism as much as they are constructed with good business sense. Top down 
operations in which a single entrepreneur is held responsible were supposed to be 
the antithesis to bureaucratic mismanagement by communists, even if they are 
not good business sense. One intern speculated that businesses avoided planning 
because it smacked of communism (#20). The spirit of anti-communism means 
something of an aversion to planning and formalized information, which of course 
can be accomplished only when the entrepreneur is familiar with cash flow 
analysis and other basic accounting knowledge. Such is the case despite planning's 
utility for building business and long range strategic goals in Western companies. 
As #11 said, 
They didn't have anything down in writing. They weren't doing 
formal planning, they weren't sharing information as well as they 
could, and they were doing a lot of fire fighting. And that happens in 
a lot of small companies in America too, but I say that, .. it's like 
they knew what they had to do but it was very hard for them to sit 
down and say OK, I'm going to write this stuff down and I'm going to 
pass it around so that everybody else knows what I know ... 
Indeed, it was the writing of a business plan which marked the greatest 
financial contribution any one intern made to a company. In 1990, one intern 
wrote a business plan for a firm which, when submitted to the Polish American 
Enterprise Fund, netted a 1.2 million dollar investment. Not surprisingly, that 
firm extended a a very gracious welcome to the next intern in the following 
summer. 
Other kinds of basic accounting knowledge which are more conceptual and 
less concrete were also notable and significant in their absence. One intern (#20) 
stressed that his employers had no sense of "opportunity cost" or "sunk costs". 
The owner of a retail store had a warehouse full of cookies that were going stale. 
The intern argued with him that he should cut their price below cost, or even 
better, offer a "buy one get one free" deal rather than get nothing for them a t  all. 
Then they had to convince the customers that in fact this was a "free box" they 
were getting when buying the first one; apparently, it was hard for many 
customers to believe that they were getting something for nothing, accustomed as 
they were to the uncreative limited initiatives of communist-style retailing. 
The changing position of accountancy in Polish business illustrates nicely the 
kind of technical assistance the interns were obliged to offer. The infusion of 
specialized technical competence was only of secondary importance to the larger 
change in mindset the interns thought they had to introduce. Cash flow analysis 
and notions of sunk and opportunity cost are not only techniques basic to 
accounting, but also ways of thinking about how to run a business. 
These examples of shifts in "mindset", toward thinking about flexible 
capacity production, business plans, sunk costs and cash flows, indicate something 
important about the Polish entrepreneur which is not caught in the connection 
between entrepreneurialism and expertise, in the connection between a spirit and 
narrow technique. Even if the entrepreneur has the spirit, even if he is risk- 
oriented, hard-working and self-directed, he may not have a sufficiently developed 
capitalist schema for processing and taking advantage of the more technical forms 
of expertise in accounting the interns were prepared to offer. 
We were surprised to discover just how much more important mindset was 
than technique. This elevation of mindset over technique could damage the image 
of technical assistance our experts are assigned to offer were it not for the 
importance of the missionary image in our experts' work. For they weren't just 
offering Poles another business culture to legitimate themselves as experts or as 
consultants. Rather, they offered a better one. This ranking of competence is most 
apparent in the "mindset" experts deemed most important for a successful Polish 
entrepreneur to have: a sense of the market. 
THE POLISH ENTREPRENEUR AND THE SENSE OF THE MARKET 
When asked about Polish business competence, a "sense of the market" was 
one of the most important qualities marking a good business person, while its 
absence denoted someone who had a lot to learn. Most of the interns learned in 
their pre-Poland intensive training course that communist economic policies 
destroyed Poles' sense of the market, and subsequently perceived one of their 
summer's significant contributions to be reintroducing the "market mentality". 
One person working in retail found that the pent up consumer demand associated 
with communism spoiled retailers into thinking that they could sell any product, 
and the customer need not really be satisfied (#20). Although several others 
talked about this (#7,8,19), #5 was most graphic, and so we quote him a t  length: 
They never did understand the idea of marketing too well. I think it 
was because under the old command system whatever you made had 
to be taken by the next person down the line because that was what 
the government told you that you had to do. I guess a good example 
was that when I was working there the company was in serious 
trouble. They had cash flow problems that were very serious. And I 
went in there and I said to them, "Well, you have cash flow problems. 
What are we going to do?" And he said, "Well, we can make thirty- 
three of these air handling units so we will sell thirty-three of these 
air handling units." And I said, "Whoa, time out. How many did you 
sell last month?" And he said five. "So what makes you think you're 
going to sell thirty-three next month?" And he had no answer for 
me. It didn't even cross his mind. He just assumed that if he made it 
someone would buy it. ... I would ask them (a bank) why they would 
lend this particular company money. And they would say, "He's good 
a t  this, he can make it." But I said, "Who's going to buy this stuff?" 
And it was stuff that I thought was generally pretty useless. And 
they just said that somebody will. They didn't give it a thought that 
it might be hard to actually sell this stuff. 
While many of the interns found the sense of the market among their Polish 
colleagues to be most deficient, many also found the "entrepreneurial spirit" of 
their associates to be the most impressive. While incorporating many of the 
aspects Szelenyi identified among his socialist entrepreneurs, the spirit the interns 
described also was identified in terms of recognizing sales opportunities and 
temporary market niches which the entrepreneur could fill. One intern (#16) 
actually found the whole of Polish culture to be "entrepreneurial", and 
characterized by this disposition: "I see an opportunity and I'm going to pursue it. 
I'm going to take risks because what I have now is nothing. So I'm more than 
willing to step forward and risk my life savings." Another (#4) provided a good 
example of this opportunity seeking when he recalled how his banking colleagues 
set up a stall to do a currency exchange when the Pope visited town in June 1991. 
Another (#20) found the owner to be able to "sell himself in any situation". Intern 
#15 had this to say: 
I think the directors I worked with were amazing, because they were 
so entrepreneurial-minded they just feel a new opportunity coming 
up. They'd come in and they'd have this idea that things were going 
this way and the trend would start turning ... They really were in 
their minds and their actions a t  the forefront. And this wasn't based 
on a lot of marketing research studies or anything. They could just 
feel the market and they knew their own population and their people 
so well. I'm not sure you can learn that in a business program, in 
fact I know you can't. But I think they had just that natural ability 
to gauge the market and find new opportunities. 
This kind of entrepreneurial inclination seems to have been constituted in 
part by the marketing sense fostered by the exigencies of the shortage economy 
during the communist era. The fact that the interns didn't label this 
entrepreneurial bent as marketing savvy, and even argued that their Polish 
business associates lacked a strong understanding of the market, can be explained 
by several factors. While it may be that this marketing sense was quite unevenly 
distributed across the Polish population, it also seems to be the case that the 
interns were observing different levels of marketing sensibilities. For instance, the 
seemingly constant changes in focus through "niche-hopping" led some interns to a 
rather skeptical attitude toward the business competence of their Polish 
colleagues. As #4 noted, 
Marketing was a problem in general. I don't think that any of them 
really had a concept of how a bank should market themselves. ... We 
did some advertising and sloganing and things like that; it was real 
rudimentary marketing. They didn't seem to have a focus. I never 
got a clear answer either because there wasn't one or because no one 
that knew the answer would tell me. They had no concept of what 
their target market was, what kind of customers should they focus on. 
They wanted to do import and export, venture capital, JV's, issue 
stock. They were trying to assist starting a stock exchange for local 
companies. And it's like, "Guys, you just don't have that much 
capital. You have to be a little bit more focused. Do you want to be 
small business, do you want to be consumer-oriented, do you want to 
do mortgages?" I think that was how I was trying to direct them. 
And nobody really wanted to listen to that. They just wanted to grab 
as much business as we (they) can. 
Polish entrepreneurs are operating in a different kind of environment than 
that to which Americans are accustomed. The Poles were accustomed to the 
shortage economy where demand always exceeded supply, and consequently 
. consumer satisfaction was not much of a factor. Under these circumstances, most 
Polish business people seemed inclined to find immediate opportunities and take 
advantage of them, rather than build up steady long term clientele to assure 
demand. In this they are reflecting the entrepreneurial spirit of the old second 
economy, where wheeling and dealing to fill gaps in the market were more 
important than establishing good relationships with customers and building 
quality products that would make the customer return again and again. To some 
extent, this old entrepreneurial spirit remains useful for grabbing capital. As one 
intern (#7) recalls, 
They told me there's an expression in Poland, "your first million is 
always illegal" ... I guess when you're in a transition there are a lot of 
loopholes and a lot of opportunities. They had a change in the law in 
terms of import duty on liquor. And supposedly there was like a two- 
day window when there was no import duty on liquor. And this guy 
knew about it and planned on it and imported just hundreds of 
thousands of bottles of vodka and beer. And he made a lot of money. 
... These people stand out in my mind in terms of taking advantage 
of a situation. And I think that in a way that in a market economy 
you need that, you need people to be entrepreneurial in nature. It 
just struck me that these people you couldn't trust. You would slide 
right off of them, they were so slimy. 
But for the Western experts, this is not the kind of marketing sensibility 
that is good "business practice" in the long run, even though it can provide the 
capital foundation for building a business. The man about whom #7 spoke used 
his profits to become a distributor for a foreign electronics firm and, in 1990, was 
the largest private company in Poland, employing 1,300 employees all around 
Poland. He moved in one year from a ten thousand dollar a year company to one 
with 100 million dollars in turnover. And according to #16, he used an American 
intern to increase his status in the legitimate business community! 
The kind of market sensibility the interns wanted to inculcate among their 
colleagues was one based on long term customer satisfaction, on the one hand, and 
discovering through market research niches that Polish producers might fill, on the 
other. One example of the latter is the market research intern #7 did for the 
potato chip industry. His consulting firm was paid a considerable amount to study 
whether potato chips, a snack that is not eaten in Poland despite their 
considerable potato production, could make it on the Polish market. The intern 
designed their study, which the consulting firm said "was something that they 
didn't know how to do, had no concept of." The intern was subsequently told by 
his employers that this contribution was the thing they most valued in his 
summer's work. Another intern's (#17) description of exceptional business people 
conveys best, however, this professional market sensibility that combines market 
research, customer satisfaction and production: 
They also understood the need for satisfying the customer. Also 
understanding what the customer wants and responding quickly to 
that. Going out and seeing what the market wants and then 
designing a product to that. They came up with a particular shirt 
and designed it and it just took off all across Poland and then people 
started making shirts very similar to theirs because they were doing 
so well. But they were out looking for the next big thing. 
The apparent inconsistency of the evaluation of Polish marketing 
competence can in part be attributed to its differential distribution across the 
population. Some Polish business people had not acquired the sense that effective 
demand for a product, and not the quality of the product per se, determines its 
potential profitability. Other entrepreneurs already were focusing on how to 
identify customers for a product, and then staying in touch with the customer to 
make sure that the product is satisfactory, thereby cultivating customer loyalty. 
But there is another reason for the varied take on the Poles' sense of the market. 
There are two kinds of market sensibilities that the interns encountered: A 
sense of opportunity and a sense of competitive consumer markets. A person 
possessing the former sense is characterized by initiative, the energy to rush to fill 
temporary consumer needs much as entrepreneurs in communism's second 
economy operated. The latter sense is important in an economy where production 
supply exceeds consumer demand. Under these new conditions, production must 
be geared toward consumer satisfaction. 
This kind of criticism of Poles' marketing savvy reflects as much the 
experience and prejudices of Western business experts' sense of business 
professionalism as conditions in Poland's economy. It is certainly the case that 
warehouses are filling up with unwanted goods, indicating the growing importance 
of estimating effective demand for a product; but it is also the case that Poland's 
post-communist economy has not yet effectively established fixed markets. Thus, 
the old opportunity seeking entrepreneur has not yet become an anachronism. 
The Western experts thus applaud the entrepreneurial mindset Poland's 
capitalists acquired under conditions of unlimited demand, but in the emergent 
post-communist capitalist economy, they don't believe it is enough. Unless the 
domestic entrepreneurial spirit is harness to a business mindset suitable to an 
economy with limited demand, as the experts7 economy is, even the most tireless 
entrepreneur is likely to fail. They are no longer working in the barter-based, 
locally networked second economy in which Szelenyi's "socialist entrepreneurs" 
thrived. They are now beginning to encounter a different kind of market, where 
foreign competition and other Polish producers can outsell them. Because both 
Western experts and Polish entrepreneurs believe that their economy is moving 
toward a system more or less like that of the West, the Polish entrepreneur who 
acquires the mindset of the successful Western business person has a greater 
chance of survival. They believe that the Western business disposition is the 
superior one. At least that is the claim our experts make, buttressed with 
elaborate accounts of their contributions to their host enterprises. 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE EXPERT 
Interns contributed in a variety of ways to their places of employment. We 
have already mentioned that they were general managerial consultants. More 
specifically, they wrote up business plans, designed market research, and 
implemented and taught their Polish colleagues about American accounting 
practices, cash flow analysis and spread sheets. They contributed in a number of 
other ways as well, although their contributions varied depending on the site of 
employment. 
The most general kind of contribution the interns made was that of being 
some kind of "example". Several (#I, 5,6,9,10,16) mentioned being a "role model" 
for their associates, even a t  the most "Western" enterprises and consulting firms. 
Working intensely for long hours was something that most of the Americans 
thought they taught the Poles about Western business. The example also went 
beyond strict behavior to the different kinds of symbols and codes indicative of 
successful business. For instance, #7 consulted them on the style of their business 
card. Two people even mentioned a style of dress: "You wearing a suit to the 
office ... I'm not saying it's right to wear a suit, however, by the time I left 
everybody was wearing ties ..." (#6) or "It was amazing how the people that I 
worked with just started dressing better" (#I). 
Familiarizing the Poles with American business practices was not just about 
business mindset, but also about learning English which is the international 
business language. This increased their competence to deal with representatives of 
foreign capital. Several interns (#2,7,10,15,19) explicitly mentioned their help in, 
as #10 put it, "wordsmithing", or "fixing the things that they want to go out and 
look spiffy, sound spiffy". Wordsmithing and editing were especially important in 
applications to international foundations for business assistance. In addition to the 
interns' ease with English, their knowledge of standard American business 
practices was of instrumental importance when it came to dealing with foreign 
investors. 
The main job of some interns (#I7 and #19) a t  consulting firms was to 
match foreign investors with potential profit making enterprises, but even this 
was not just a technical matter based on accounting expertise. For instance, one 
intern (#5) worked directly with the enterprise director in his negotiations with a 
German firm to establish a joint venture. The Poles were apprehensive about 
dealing with a firm that was so much wealthier and more savvy, and thought that 
the presence of an American a t  the negotiations would only be helpful. Their fears 
may have been well founded, for a joint venture was never established, and the 
Polish firm was instead "swallowed up" by the German firm after the intern left. 
The connotation of this intern's story, as well as of several others in similar 
positions, was that the Poles' business competence was inadequate before 
sophisticated Western capital. The only chance of realizing fair deals for the Poles 
came in having another Western expert on hand to balance the distribution of 
business expertise in making the deal. Of course not all of the interns were 
mediating between Western and Polish capital, but for all interns, their "Western" 
identity was crucial to their authority. 
In the consulting firms run by Americans that also employed some Poles, 
the interns did not find their business competence so distinctive; as one intern 
(#19) said, "they were just another pair of hands". Nevertheless, their identity as 
American was crucial to their job, especially when it came to assessing the 
profitability of Polish firms (a service performed by #8,12,13,19 and 16). In 
describing work he has done for another accounting firm in Czechoslovakia, #12 
commented that 
The Czech government wanted somebody outside the government to 
say these companies are not going to make it, they should be 
liquidated rather than allowing the Czech government to just let 
them go bankrupt. So, it kind of solidifies their position in the 
government. Because of the outside expertise, it's less likely the 
companies will say, "You're wrong in doing this to us." 
I t  is quite plausible to believe that the consulting firm contracted by the 
Polish government, for which several interns worked, had a similar mission: to 
create the impression that a neutral foreign expertise and not a domestic political 
bias established which firms should get help, and which firms should fail. In this 
case too, then, Western identity was inseparable from "expertise". This was on 
two grounds: its relative insulation from domestic politics, and its superior culture 
for making business. 
Interns working for private businesses found themselves working more on 
personnel and hiring (#4,9,20) than those working for state enterprises or 
consulting firms. One person (#4), for instance, helped to hire those who would 
work in a newly established bank and taught them about capital markets, how to 
set up credit policies, lending practices and so on. Teaching about Western 
markets and finance was something done by several interns beyond their regular 
employment too. In addition to helping assess firms' profitability, #12 also taught 
classes in Lodz to about 90 people on "beginning business stuff that you would 
learn in your introductory MBA courses". 
Finally, it is important to note that several interns found that the Polish 
companies didn't know how to use their knowledge and experience, especially a t  
the beginning of their stay. While some firms eventually figured out what the 
interns could do, other firms apparently never did use them very effectively (#1,5). 
The reasons for this underutilization varied. Most often, as in the case of #1, the 
sheer scale of the larger enterprises made the intern feel her contributions to be 
rather limited. Scale is not the only factor, however; #5, for instance, found his 
expertise untapped a t  his first job a t  a small private firm. He was not sure why, 
but he suspected that the firm didn't trust him. Lack of information concerning an 
intern's abilities also led to the opposite problem: sometimes the Poles expected too 
much (#lo). 
In sum, the interns contributed to their places of employment in a variety of 
ways, depending on the character of their enterprise. Those in larger enterprises 
generally found it more difficult to make a difference, because of the firm's 
organizational complexity and magnitude of problems, and because of the 
relatively greater inaccessibility of key decision makers (#I). In smaller Polish 
firms the interns made a more significant impact, most notably in writing up 
business plans, designing marketing studies and working with international 
agencies and purchases. In some instances, the intern even helped the Polish firm 
obtain an investment or make a large financial deal. In consulting firms where 
many Westerners were already present, the interns were more or less "another 
pair of hands", but it was significant that these hands were not Polish. Not only 
was their particular expertise important, but' their status as an American was also 
important for the job they needed to do. This "credential", in fact, turns out to be 
far more important than we expected. This finding, however, is consistent with 
the centrality of the cultural transformation in defining technical assistance, and 
image of the interns' role as missionaries from a country with superior business 
culture. 
CREDENTIALS OF THE EXPERT 
"Credentials" are the sign used in modern societies to indicate a certain 
kind of competence, and educational degrees are the principal indication of that 
~ r e d e n t i a l i n ~ . ~ ~  Although the experts in this study are students, and therefore 
not as highly credentialed as they might be, only two interns (#3,19) found their 
age and student status to be a hindrance to their transmission of expertise. 
Instead, the level of general education these interns already had was considered a 
definite asset when it came to dealing with Polish business people. Two of three 
engineers found their engineering education to be a credential their Polish 
associates appreciated; five of the six accountants found their degree to carry some 
weight with their colleagues. 
It was surprising, though, that many of the interns found that their status 
as an MBA student didn't matter (#1,2,7,13,15,17), mainly because the Poles did 
not "really understand the MBA too much" (#15); "usually you have to explain 
what the MBA program is or whatever because most people don't have a concept 
of an MBA" (#13). Only one intern specifically stated that the MBA credential 
mattered (#11), and that was because she was employed in a firm which had a 
Michigan MBA in the previous year who did an especially good job. We did not 
anticipate discovering the relative unimportance of the MBA degree given the 
efforts undertaken by Polish higher education administrators to build business 
education programs in Poland. In the conclusion, we shall consider further this 
gap between the emphasis of higher education off~cials on the degree, and the 
experience of Western experts among their associates in Polish business. 
Two other kinds of credentials were far and away more important for these 
interns than those associated with education: work experience and nationality. 
Whatever skepticism met these interns initially, their business experience before 
20 See for instance Randall Collins, The Credential Society. Academic Press, 1979. 
returning to school was often enough to convince their Polish associates of their 
capacity to contribute (#2,3,8,11,12,16,17,20). As #2 recalled, 
Going in and saying "I go to business school and I'm an MBA," that 
doesn't mean anything to them. They don't understand what that is. 
But the first day they found that I worked in a company in the 
United States that made parts, then I reached into my little briefcase 
and I pulled out a bunch of parts and they looked and they were 
amazed a t  some of the things we did. Like, "How fine those circuit 
tracers are." And they would be asking how we did that. And I 
think in a way that meant something to them. They also realized 
this guy understands how to make parts in the circuit boards. That 
meant something to them. So I think those kinds of things were the 
most important. And you have to make that connection on their level 
and show then that you have some kind of expertise that is related to 
the expertise they have. 
Their work experience did not have to be in the same field or industry as 
their Polish companies in order for it to carry weight, however. For instance, #11 
recalled that "It was really interesting because when they asked me about the 
company I had worked for and found out that we had managed sixty-three billion 
dollars in assets. I mean that was like WOW, okay, this person obviously is not 
just a student ...'I, or #12: "Being able to say that I worked for this international 
CPA firm, and they know of them now. When I walk in there and say that I 
spent a few years there, and ask if I can name some of the companies I've worked 
for in the US, and they've heard of them, like Chrysler Corporation, that earns 
credibility immediately". Credibility in Polish business therefore is much less 
likely to be won with educational titles, and more likely to be associated with one's 
work experience in a prestigious and powerful firm. To date, most of these firms 
had to be US or international, but two interns (#12,19) found that their 
employment by a Western-owned consulting firm located exclusively in Poland did 
carry some weight with the Polish managers for whom they consulted. 
The experts' interpretation of Poles' reception of their credentials further 
undermines the image of this program as mere technical assistance, as simply the 
transmission of expertise. Competence was not found in their holding an 
appropriate education, the typical credential for recognizing expertise. Instead, it 
was found in an experience that was not translatable into a standardized body of 
knowledge that could be credentialed with a degree.21 Indeed, this elevation of 
work experience over educational credentials is all the more striking given that the 
interns' presence in their firm was a consequence of a business school's efforts. 
The features that are normally associated with "expertise" -- higher 
education and technical cores of demonstrated competence -- are not sufficiently 
central in the the "experts"' accounts of their work to allow us to use notions of 
"technical assistance" without some qualification. Given the centrality of cultural 
transformations in their work, another image of this international aid should be 
considered, especially when one considers the most important "credential" upon 
which our "experts" relied. 
By far the most important claim to competence that these experts 
(#1,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,15,19,20) noted was their American or Western 
identity. The significance of this status has been mentioned already in a couple of 
ways. First, it allows the expert to create an even more "neutral" claim to 
competence because the foreigner is oblivious to the internal political games being 
played out in these post-communist transformations, even while they are very 
important actors in the more global political economic transformation the making 
of post-communist capitalism represents. Second, in as much as the money and 
the business savvy are perceived to rest outside of Poland in the advanced 
capitalist world, these experts carry with them a culture of success whose 
emulation by Poles might grant privileged access, or whose employment by Poles 
might enable better negotiations in joint ventures. And third, more purely 
practical skills such as writing business plans are associated with Western 
2 1  At least this is how our experts understand the reaction of the Poles; it reflects their own 
rather anti-academic approach to business, apparent in their accounts of competent Polish 
business professionals, in which they criticize business orientations for being too academic. 
business practices which Poles are not accustomed to doing. With all of this comes 
a new and important status for the representative of capitalism's core. In what 
follows, we reconstruct how our experts understood the celebration of American 
business competence. 
THE CULTURAL POWER OF THE WEST AND AMERICA 
Seven interns (#5,9,10,11,13,15,20) found that they were encountering 
stereotypes of Americans: that Americans know all the answers to business needs. 
One person (#13) who worked in Poland for a large state firm in 1990, and then in 
1991 for a consulting firm, said this in response to a question in the summer of 
1991 about his list of credentials: 
Again it seems more as a representative of the United States. That's 
your biggest credential usually ... So it is more of that you come from 
a country that is very much looked up to in the eyes of Poland. I 
think in some instances overly looked up at, because nobody believes 
that the US has problems. Or a lot of people don't believe that the 
US has problems. And that's probably the number one credential. 
And we use that a lot to leverage our ideas when we're telling people 
about new ways of doing business that are foreign to them and 
doesn't sound quite right, like selling the rights to the ownership of 
money -- that their customers own it .... You put them a t  ease by 
saying that it's very common in the West, that it's a typical everyday 
thing and there's no need to be concerned about it. And that kind of 
puts them to rest ... 
Thus, Western or American status gives the expert an additional power to 
reinforce their advice: Not only is their knowledge technically superior, but it 
comes from a broader culture and world that is successful and "normal", which in 
this context means a society that has not been tainted by more than four decades 
of communism. But while it gave the American experts an additional form of 
authority, it also led their associates to expect more of them than the Americans 
were prepared to offer; #10 called it with a familiar laugh, "the magic wand 
thing". As #9 elaborated, 
They thought I knew all the answers. The would all have really 
difficult problems and expect a thirty second answer because they're 
used to the sound bites on TV of American politicians. I just couldn't 
do it. I don't think I met their expectations by coming up with quick 
answers ... They didn't know what we could do, so they assumed we 
could do everything which is sort of amazing! 
Built upon this respect, even awe, of American business competence, was a 
generally positive disposition toward American culture. Poles have an important 
link to the USA through the very large Polish American community built over the 
last century, but the cultural tie goes beyond one of migration-based sentiment. 
The USA, especially under Reagan, was seen as the cultural and political force 
most realistically opposing communism in the world, and thereby supporting 
Poland. But in general, as #4 noted: "They have a very nice view of America and 
they really like anything American and they think every American is a genius, 
basically. That they've had all these great opportunities and that we have gold on 
the streets and the whole thing. But they see you as sort of this icon almost." 
This was in especial comparison to their attitudes toward Germans. 
Most of the Americans found that their Polish associates disliked, distrusted 
or feared Germans (#3,5,6,7,9,11,12,13,15,16,17). One (#17) recalled that she 
was in Poland a t  the time of German unification, and "every single Pole I talked 
to was extremely nervous about that. They were also extremely nervous about 
West Germans coming in, buying Polish companies or doing business with Polish 
companies." Another (#9) said, "They tried to distance themselves from German 
culture. In fact, the bank didn't want t o  make loans to German companies so 
much.. . . They're fearful of being exploited by the Germans in terms of business. " 
Still another (#6) recalled "We had very lucrative deals with some German 
counterparts and they were turned down because they (Poles a t  the intern's firm) 
felt that the Germans would be a threat to their culture." The transmission of 
business expertise to Poland may thus not just be something that can be done 
equally well by any "Western" nationality. At least it seems that Americans have 
a kind of national cultural capital that advantages them considerably over 
Germans. The experience of these American consultants is not unusual. When 
Poles were asked in a nationally representative survey with whom they preferred 
to do business, Americans came out on top in 1 9 9 0 . ~ ~  
The only other nationality to receive much mention was the Russians. Most 
of the Americans found that their Polish colleagues looked down upon Russians: 
"As for Russia, (my friend) told me, 'If you think its bad here, you should go to 
Russia.' He said the people from Russia come over here and think they're in 
Western Europe" (#12). The French and British received scant mention despite 
their considerable assistance to Polish reconstruction--the French and British 
governments each give more overall aid to the Poles than the United States 
government. Of course these American experts were likely to note and evoke 
positive comments on American society, but the positive disposition toward the 
US, especially in comparison to Germans and Russians, is hard to miss. This 
positive disposition towards Americans may be subject to change, especially as 
Americans become more common, come to be associated with the rich, and the 
standard of living for the common Pole continues to plummet. One expert of 
Polish descent (#13) who worked in Poland through the Michigan program for two 
consecutive summers noticed a difference between summers: 
I feel resentment a lot of the time directed a t  me and I take a tram to 
work or whatever and I'm dressed in a suit, and I don't know if that's 
directed a t  me because I'm a foreigner or if it's directed a t  me because 
I'm wearing a business suit and carrying a briefcase. I'm a model of 
capitalism and I'm cued as having money and they don't have it. ... 
Last year I felt like I was more of a curiosity and there really wasn't 
any resentment. This year I think I feel more resentment. I had 
someone who was in management in one of the companies kind of 
telling me about his philosophy about foreign investments in the 
company, and them saying that he didn't really want foreign 
investments in the company. They wanted to keep it all for 
themselves; saying, "I'm sure you'd understand this because you're 
Polish.. . " 
22 See W. Adamski, et al. l 3 . h ~  'B. Warsaw: PAN IF'iS, 1991. 
Another factor that could in the future deflate the image of American 
business experts in Poland is the prevalence of Western "carpetbaggersm--people 
who take advantage of the Polish economic difficulties, their relative business 
inexperience, and the general admiration of things Western, in order to gain 
financial advantage. As an intern (#19) from another business school remarked, 
The problem is also that Poles need to know, be told, who to listen to. 
The problem is that there's a lot of people giving advice which is 
inappropriate. That's a serious big problem. The best thing that 
could happen to Poland is that there would be someone here to tell 
them whose advice to take. There's a lot of people out here hawking 
bad advice. There are really a lot of carpetbaggers. 
Many Poles' admiration for things Western leads them to be taken 
advantage of by these carpetbaggers, as #9 recalled. 
They (his firm) spent a lot of zlotys on the training program to hire 
an outside firm from Switzerland, because they felt that anything 
Western was inherently better than anything Polish. And so this 
firm came in and they had no experience dealing with consultants. 
They put on a slide show and took them to dinner. And they (his 
firm) were so impressed with the professionalism, they didn't look a t  
the content of the course. And when I actually read the books that 
they were going to be using, I didn't think they were worth the 
money they were being charged. But the Poles couldn't quite see 
through that. 
Although this intern's associates didn't see through the Western professional 
veneer, and in fact were still smitten by it, other interns found their colleagues 
beginning to express some resentment of Western interference. One enterprise 
president 
expressed resentment toward Westerners who think they know 
everything, coming in, changing the Polish system, and then leaving 
their dirty work for other people to do ... Jeffery Sacks--despises him, 
absolutely despises him. Thinks he is a confused ivory tower 
academic who is too full of his own self to see the real problems that 
are going on in Poland, and has neither the ability nor the intelligence 
to fix them.. and that (attitude) kind of spread to the Westerners who 
were involved in the politics. He didn't care so much about 
Westerners in business, in fact the more the merrier ...( #lo). 
It is likely, therefore, that as the love affair between Western experts and 
Polish business begins to fade, the glow of American culture might fade along with 
it, and not just because of bad advice or ignorance. It is quite plausible that the 
kind of expertise and wisdom the West has in abundance may not be adequate to 
the task of making the post-communist transition successful. Bad advice, 
presumably, is advice that is somehow ineffective. I t  is possible, however, that 
"good" advice may be helpful in general, or in the long term, but in the short 
term, disastrous for particular companies or particular employees. As #13 recalls, 
All they (the company being studied by this consulting firm) know is 
that (we are) a group of Western consultants sponsored by the Polish 
government. So I really, ... I'm not sure what the people think in 
the company of why we're there. ... that we're there to help them. 
It's something we're always trying to stress in our interviews. ... 
They see somebody in a suit and tie taking notes around the factory 
and they think you're there either to buy the place up or shut it 
down; which may happen as a result of what we do. But we're really 
there in the best interests of the company and the country ... 
There are two basic models within which cultural relations between the 
"Advanced" and the "Primitive" might be understood: that of missionary work and 
that of cultural imperialism. The difference between these two forms of cultural 
interaction not only lie in objectively different forms of interaction, but also in the 
perceptions of the providers and especially the recipients of cultural assistance. 23 
These American interns could maintain the role of missionary fairly well 
because they were generally working with Polish colleagues who were relatively 
well off. Given the very positive disposition toward American culture these Polish 
colleagues displayed, the image of business expert as capitalist missionary could be 
retained. It is likely that the appeal of American culture could continue among 
23 The Hawaiians initially received Captain Cook as a god, positively disposed as they were to 
outside cultural influences. Although East Europeans hardly accord Western business a divine 
status, their reception of "technical assistance" has likewise been exceptionally positive. It is quite 
possible, too, that as the Hawaiians lost faith in Captain Cook, so East Europeans may transform 
the cultural model with which they interpret this Western aid. For a fascinating account of the 
cultural transformations involved in the Hawaiian case, see Marshall Sahlins, Historical 
M v t h i c a l :  Structure in the Earlv Historv of the Sandwich Xslands. . . Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981. 
the economic and entrepreneurial elite as the experts continue to help these 
relatively privileged Polish firms. 
Though for many, especially for those whose jobs are lost or whose firms are 
shut down as a consequence of American and Western expertise, the resonance of 
Western culture might become quite different. The negative disposition toward 
German culture and its economic interests, based on historical memories of 
German oppression, make German expertise less appreciated. The positive 
association of American interests with Poland's liberation has helped Western 
experts cultivate an apolitical missionary status which has helped their consulting 
role. But that apolitical positive image may not last. 
THE OBSTACLES TO POLISH ECONOMIC REFORM 
We asked each of our experts their opinion on the "biggest obstacle in 
Poland's transformation to a market economy". This question was designed to 
move our experts outside the world of their firm, to have them evaluate how the 
needs of the general transition were connected to their own efforts and experience. 
Many of the answers had to do with inadequate infrastructures for foreign 
investment, such as the telephone and banking systems (#3,5,7,11). Several 
mentioned the continuing existence of large state factories andlor workers' power 
in them (#3,4,9,11,10,19). Although these problems were considered significant, 
politics and government practices were mentioned as the major underlying factors 
preventing the successful resolution of the more substantive matters relating to 
business. 
Many of the interns found the legal infrastructure too uncertain, and the 
government itself too indecisive. "The government cannot make a decision, or will 
not make a decision", commented #12. Very often, the interns thought that both 
national and local governments were neither staying the course of economic reform 
nor encouraging foreign investment sufficiently (#5,6,8,10,13,15,17). 
Many of the interns and their Polish colleagues considered the Balcerowicz 
plan of shock therapy to be the best course of action (#6,8,12,19), and found the 
politics of former prime ministers Tadeusz Mazowiecki (#8,12,15,16) and Jan 
Krzysztof Bielecki (#7,9) good. Their colleagues never thought highly of Lech 
Walesa, and when our interns mentioned him he was never considered to be 
adequate for leading the country toward reform (#2,3,5,7,9,11,12). For some of 
these experts, the government and even their colleagues were too sensitive to the 
political consequences of economic reform (#8,19). Some thought that the country 
was even "too democratic" for the success of economic reform. 
Poland is more democratic than the United States, and that's a 
problem when you're trying to lead a country through a very difficult 
time. They can't stick to one policy. The foreign investment laws are 
very attractive to outside companies because it allows full 
repatriation of profits, i t  allows one hundred percent ownership, 
lucrative tax incentives, etc. But there is no guarantee that's going to 
stay. So, if I were investing, it's just too risky. You just don't know 
what's going to happen in the next week. And my feeling is that it is 
too democratic. People have too much of a say in what their future is 
going to be. ... I think that you just need enlightened people. 
Enlightened despot is the best type of government, my feeling is, and 
they just don't have it (#7). 
Another intern (#lo) found that the problem of "self-inflicted pain" in the 
guise of economic reform was impossible with a democracy like Poland's, and she 
thought that a "benevolent dictatorship", like that of Singapore, might be the only 
way. 
The contradiction between democracy and economic reform in the minds of 
these experts was most apparent in their number one problem for the success of 
economic reform: the "mindset" of the general population of Poles, a problem 
mentioned by nearly all of those interviewed. Of all the responses to our 
questions, the problem of the popular Polish "mindset" as an obstacle to economic 
reform was the most consistent, and was often identified as people needing to 
"embrace change," but failing to. This popular mindset is different from the 
problematic mindset associated with their Polish business associates, even though 
the same word is used. 
The popular m i n d ~ e t ~ ~  is clearly much further from the experts' valuation 
of business sense than that mindset of their entrepreneurial colleagues. According 
to our experts, the mindset characteristic of the general population is close minded 
with a poor work ethic. It fails to take bad news seriously, and fails to recognize 
how much really needs to change. It fails to recognize that in a market system, 
one gets ahead through talent and effort. Many Poles don't understand just how 
hard they have to work for the reform to have a chance of success. They don't 
recognize just how much initiative, company spirit, sacrifice, and training in 
modern business practices is necessary. Implied in the notion of mindset is a 
normative standard, an American standard, against which the majority of Poles do 
not measure-up. I t  is, however, fortunate for the development of private business 
activity that such a mindset is not distributed evenly across the polish population. 
Most of the interns' colleagues do have a mindset that is more conducive to 
developing a capitalist business, but their entrepreneurial spirit and energy need 
to be channelled in a "rational" (Weberian) way. It is only possible to train those 
24 This general mindset might be considered the "basic" orientation in need of change throughout 
Poland, even while more specific problematic mindsets are held by Polish entrepreneurs. The 
ingredients upon which this generally problematic "mindset" rests include these quotations: being 
"close minded" (#I), not knowing "what it's like to work in a society where you get ahead based 
upon your abilities and actions" (#2), not having a class of "effective business people" (#3), having 
"big expectations" (#4), "how you change your thinking on the market, work ethic" and that they 
"don't realize the amount of sacrifice and change in the culture that's necessary" (#5), "sense of 
self worth not as  high a s  it could be ... work ethic is totally screwed" (#6), get people "on board to 
understand what is going on in modern business" (#7), "lack of initiative, of drive, which 
translates into a strategy of growth" (#8), "often felt powerless and helpless" (#9), "attitudes that 
need to change ... the general manager may be very accepting of recommendations and advice 
form consultants of a new outlook ... all the people under him are not ... not recognizing that their 
company is already technically bankrupt" (#13) "way of thinking" about individualism (#15), 
"understanding the need for change" (#17), "refuse to believe bad news" (#19), "hard to have 
company spirit" (#20). 
with potential, those with the appropriate entrepreneurial spirit. In fact, one 
expert said explicitly, 
These (business training programs) are really valuable to me because 
you need to train somebody with a lot of motivation because it takes 
a lot of hard work and sacrifice to get a business started. You should 
train those who have the drive rather than the current employees of 
like state-owned enterprise who may not have vision or drive. It's 
foolish to put your effort and training into those people. You need to 
put it into people who WANT to do something (#8). 
The identification of "mindset" as a main obstacle to both general reform 
and to the making of a successful business person exemplifies the overall 
missionary role played by our Western experts whose aim is to inculcate the 
capitalist mindset. In this civilizing effort, however, only some of the population 
can be saved; and it is the values of this leading class which must dominate the 
business sector and define the role that the state and politics should play. 
In the center of the world capitalist system from which our experts come, 
democracy can be associated with capitalism and our experts can find the linkage 
natural. But it is hard for them to associate democracy with a successful 
capitalism in Poland because the major obstacle to a successful economic reform 
that most of the experts find is the "mindset" of the majority of the population. 
This mindset translates into a democracy and government which fail to support 
radical economic change, which in turn discourages foreign investment. The MBA 
interns intuitively recognize, then, what Bialecki and Mach found in their analysis 
of the values and priorities of Polish society and its political elites. Polish 
communism has infused Poland with a culture positively antagonistic to the way of 
the advanced capitalist market (#5,7,8,10,11,13,16,17,19,20). Although there 
may an entrepreneurial culture (#16) among some, it is not sufficiently 
widespread. Even these entrepreneurs often don't have the Western capitalist 
rnindset that can develop business and the economy in the long run. There are a 
few Poles who are able to acquire the mindset to make capitalism work in Poland. 
The experts work with them. 
If one extends the logic of these experts' experiences, there is only one way 
for post-communist capitalism to thrive: if these like-minded experts and Polish 
entrepreneurs can guide the country, establish a new system run on market 
principles, and thereby discipline a new generation of Poles into a market 
mentality. For the time being, democracy, politics or both appear to stand in the 
way. But by casting the economic problem in terms of an inadequate mindset that 
is common to both the general population and entrepreneurs, the experts partially 
overcome their apparent opposition to the politics of democracy. 
For our experts to identify these two very'dispositions as "mindsets" does 
not seem appropriate. The "popular" mindset, after all, refers to the virtual 
absence, or even antagonism, to the capitalist imagination. Their employers' 
mindset, by contrast, only refers to a limited, if nascent and therefore redeemable, 
capitalist imagination. The interns' common usage may simply reflect a limited 
conceptual vocabulary, but it might be more than that, too. We believe the 
following reconstruction embodies the deep cultural logic of our experts' 
capitalist missionary work. 
By identifying the mindset problem as common to both entrepreneurs and 
the general population, our experts reinforce the notion that both entrepreneurs 
and the larger population have had the same experience, and are therefore of the 
same group. Since they are struggling to leave the same past predicament, they 
have the same interests because they are are headed in the same direction. 
Therefore, Poles don't have daerent interests based on positions in the new 
political economic order; they just have more and less adequate spirits for the new 
capitalist order, depending on the distance of their mindset from the thinking 
associated with the old system. By assisting those with mindsets closest to their 
own, the experts just help to strengthen the position of people best suited to 
bringing civilization as they know it to Poland. For our missionaries, capitalism 
and democracy implicitly go together in civilization, although their "job", their 
91 expertise", is to think about making capitalism, not democracy. Thus when 
pressed about their "opposition" to the general mindset in Poland, they can defend 
themselves from a charge of undermining democracy by claiming that the popular 
mindset is not so much the expression of democracy as it is the expression of the 
old socialism. That orientation must then be transcended in order that capitalism 
and democracy can thrive in post-communist society. In the view of these 
missionaries, capitalism and democracy are implicitly linked, even though it is 
most clearly capitalism that takes precedence. 
TRANSFORMING CULTURE, TRANSMITTING EXPERTISE 'AND 
MAKING POST-COMMUNIST CAPITALISM 
Post-communist capitalism is a new social formation in world history. The 
visionaries of this formation25 know what they want, more or less, for the model 
lies in some form either in North America or Western Europe. They also believe 
that they know how it can be built, more or less. They know that the economy 
must have competition, that private businesses must be allowed to grow and 
flourish, and that a new business class must develop. The West generally agrees 
with the direction of change posited by post-communist capitalism's visionaries, 
and is offering technical assistance to facilitate that movement. This paper has 
been an analysis of one such effort in the transmission of expertise, in the 
provision of technical assistance. 
We have studied this transmission of expertise by interviewing most of the 
Western experts who participated in the 1990 and 1991 University of Michigan 
25 see Bialecki and Mach, op cit. 
MBA Corps, as well as other key actors in the program. We have studied 
documents produced by these experts, as well as publications that were written 
about them. We were not with them in their work, nor have we had the 
opportunity to interview their Polish associates. Our data, then, don't allow us to 
say very much about Polish businesses per se. But these data are important 
sources for understanding the interaction between Western business expertise and 
Polish entrepreneurs from the perspective of the West. We think this kind of data 
is important for several reasons: 1) it provides a rich source of qualitative data 
whose primary collection by participant observers would take years, even if those 
observers were themselves sufficiently competent in business to understand what 
was happening; 2) the way in which these Western experts and others like them 
"represent" their experiences will have an impact on the response of foreign 
capital to Polish economic opportunities; 3) this kind of program represents a 
fundamentally different kind of international aid than either financial assistance 
or top level experts assisting in macroeconomic adjustments, and thus deserves 
special note. 
This program was designed to help make a business class that is central to 
the popular conception of post-communist capitalism. And while this is a small 
program, writ large it could be essential to the formation of a new class to the 
extent it makes them more competent business people. Even within this small 
program, it is important to reiterate that an intern's success in developing more 
competent business people varied tremendously according to work environment. 
The Michigan MBA Corps placed MBA students into a variety of Polish 
enterprises. Those students placed within large state firms felt less consequential 
in their contributions. Those students working aside other Western experts or 
Polish consultants with considerable Western experience felt valuable, but just like 
another pair of hands. Those who interned in small private firms were generally 
best able to explain specifically how they helped their companies improve their 
performance. The recollections of the interns reinforce the disposition of the Corps 
director: internships might be most consequential in small private firms which 
have had limited contact with Western business. 
These small firms were also quite likely to have a t  their helms 
entrepreneurs who impressed the interns with their business ability. But this 
impression was typically not based on personnel management skills, knowledge of 
their product, or international business savvy. Instead, the interns were 
impressed with Polish entrepreneurs for their entrepreneurial spirit and their 
ability to exploit their intuition to develop their business. 
At the same time, these interns were able to help the'entrepreneurs build 
better businesses. Although some kinds of technical knowledge were important, 
the degree of sophistication needed to teach it was not that great. Although 
Western accounting knowledge was important, the Polish colleagues were a t  such 
a rudimentary level that any business student with work experience could provide 
it. Nevertheless, one can identify specific fields which business consultants should 
be prepared to advise: personnel management, accounting and marketing 
techniques. 
These technical specializations that the interns brought to their firms were 
inseparable, however, from more general cultural transformations of business 
practices the interns sought to engender. Indeed, some of the cultural 
transformations they encouraged were a t  odds with that entrepreneurial spirit 
they so much admired. 
If the old entrepreneurial spirit was based on an instinctual feel for the 
market and the ability to switch gears and take up new lines of business a t  the 
drop of a hat, the more "professional" business disposition was oriented toward 
accumulating capital through business plans based on cash flow analysis and 
market research. The "technical assistance" offered by the interns was not just 
the introduction of new techniques; rather, it was an attempt to help develop a 
new kind of business person, one with a "mindset" presumably more suitable to a 
developed capitalist market economy. They sought to engender a capitalist spirit 
like that described by Weber, one that combined initiative with calculation and 
rationality based on techniques and their associated concepts characteristic of 
advanced capitalism. 
In the old command economy, demand always exceeded supply and one 
could be assured of finding a customer. In the new economy, supply is beginning 
to exceed demand. Warehouses are filling up with unwanted goods. Even 
improving the shoddy quality of products associated with communist practices does 
not guarantee sales; now, entrepreneurs must plan ahead and decide whether a 
product could be sold. And in an economy of increasing competition, the business 
person must figure out which niche they can occupy in the economy, and how they 
can make their customers loyal to assure continued profitability. To survive in the 
new economy, one must not only have an entrepreneurial spirit, and not only the 
techniques of international capitalism, but also the mindset or culture that is 
embedded in those techniques. The interns were helping to cultivate such a group 
of Polish business professionals with their advice. 
The interns identified their work as general managerial consulting. That 
they were working on a MBA was more or less immaterial for the Poles, but given 
the salaries the MBA students could have commanded on an open market, the 
Polish firms got quite a deal. Most of the interns were not interested in working 
in Poland after receiving their degrees. Thus the Polish firms had the opportunity 
to work with Western business people who would not otherwise work in Poland, 
and for a good price. I t  is a very sensible strategy for aiding Polish business 
development. 
It  was surprising, however, how little Polish entrepreneurs knew about the 
MBA degree, for that does not resonate with the considerable interest we have 
found in business education among the officials of Polish higher education. 
Although this requires further research and reflection, one might consider 
business education to be a fundamentally different strategy for building a business 
class in Poland than the on-the-job training offered by the Michigan program.26 
Business schools are providing business education to entrepreneurs, managers from 
state enterprises and students aspiring to be entrepreneurs, not to those 
necessarily succeeding in private business. They are also providing important and 
relatively lucrative teaching opportunities for academics suitably trained to offer 
business courses. Finally, formal business education is a conduit for Western 
agencies to provide assistance to help build business in Poland when they don't 
have direct links to the emergent business class itself, as the Michigan program 
did. 
The Michigan program was a much leaner operation than most of the 
business schools we have studied, and had a definite anti-academic bias in 
comparison to the new business education programs. The Michigan program was 
not concerned with educational credentials nor with academic styles. Instead, 
"practical" lessons for making better business were provided to Polish 
entrepreneurs by these young experts. The interns felt, however, that they could 
cultivate that "superior" business disposition only among those already so inclined. 
Without the entrepreneurial spirit, the professional business expertise of the West 
cannot help. And indeed that may be one of the most profound problems facing 
Poland. 
26 Jan Szczucki and Michael Kennedy are working on a paper to explain the dynamism of 
business education in Polish higher education. 
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When asked about the obstacles facing Polish economic reform, the 
instability of Polish-politics in 1990-91 was considered to be the foundation for 
other more technical problems like inadequate foreign investment and poor 
business infrastructures. But even the instability of Polish politics itself is 
grounded in an assessment of Polish culture that resonates with other sociological 
research. 
Our Western experts find the "mindset" of Polish society to be among the 
most serious obstacles to the success of post-communist capitalism. While there is 
an entrepreneurial spirit among some, most of the population appears unready 
and not willing to adopt the practices that make capitalism work. The majority 
. 
may be too socialist or egalitarian for reform to work in the near future. 
At the same time, however, the interns are usually confident about the 
prospects of their own firms. Most of the firms were able to use their interns quite 
effectively, and in some cases, actually make a lot of money on the basis of the 
interns' consulting. And as they are exposed to interns like these, who have no 
special interest other than to aid their firm, these firms will become better able to 
cope with future economic problems and negotiate better with those business 
people who come from abroad eager to make money. 
If there is a policy recommendation that might be made on the basis of this 
research, it is for more of the same. Very few enterprises have benefitted from 
this type of infusion of Western business expertise. The more that can benefit, the 
sooner will the Polish entrepreneurial spirit be hinged to Western business 
expertise and mindset. And the United States of America may be in an 
outstanding position to make that union. 
Of all the credentials the interns found important for their work, their 
American citizenship was most important. In Poland, the "West" was perceived to 
have been communism's opponent, and an example of what society should be like. 
The USA, in particular, is highly regarded given its prominence in the anti- 
communist struggle and its willingness to accept so many generations of emigre 
Poles. Additionally, this positive perception of Americans is defined in opposition 
to Poles' decidedly negative perception of Germany. Extensive German business 
investment coupled with the cultural rift between Poles and Germans makes 
American business associations even more appealing. US business has a great 
opportunity in Poland. If Western business practices are to develop most rapidly, 
the USA, and not only Germany, should be identified with foreign capital and 
business. This is obviously not only of benefit for Poland. Cooperation with Polish 
business may yield US capital the best point of entry into the new Europe. The 
economic interests of US business in Europe may depend on developing more 
programs like that which the University of Michigan began. Several important 
lessons might be taken from an examination of this program for the development 
of others. 
First, programs that provide Western business consultants must work 
through reliable Polish colleagues to recommend reputable places of employment. 
There are too many corrupt and illegal business practices in Polish post- 
communism for naive Western experts to avoid on their own. Second, the more 
cultural and linguistic training that can be provided to Western interns, the better. 
For without this kind of familiarity, it is more likely that good advice could get 
bottled up in a corner, especially in large firms where translators can act not only 
as facilitators but as barriers to important decision makers. Third, to the extent 
that English language training programs in Poland can be expanded, the potential 
pool of Poles with whom these interns can speak will grow. Poland already has 
taken giant steps. to make English as a foreign language available, as have the 
United States Peace Corps and the British Knowhow Fund. These efforts should 
be extended and supported as one of the most valuable forms of technical 
assistance the US can offer. 
The generic term "technical assistance" implies a wide range of activities. 
At their foundation lies the quality of knowledge we call "expertise". Expertise 
implies something both specialized and technical, on the one hand, and apolitical 
or neutral, on the other. It is conceiveable that this connotation of apolitical 
specialized competence can be applied to the insertion of Western experts into 
relatively formalized structures removed from the everyday worlds of Poles.) 
Expertise can be recognized among the experts who participate in Western 
consulting or accounting firms deciding which firms should be given a chance to 
live and which should be liquidated. But those experts working alongside Poles for 
extended periods of time are not only transmitting expertise in a narrow field. 
They are partly transforming Polish culture by helping to create a Polish business 
class that is more aware of capitalist practices in the West. The experts don't 
bring entrepreneurial values, although they may inspire Poles to work even 
harder. They do however bring a different kind of business disposition, a new 
"mindset", that reflects practices of business in a mature corporate capitalism, not 
the practices of the primitive "buccaneer capitalism" characterizing early Polish 
post-communism. The Western experts in our study are providing technical 
assistance, but within a larger cultural framework that transforms the way Polish 
entrepreneurs think about business. To think about this larger cultural 
framework as "technical assistance" is misleading. 
All forms of expertise are encoded within larger cultural frames that both 
empower the expert to act, and defend the expert from charges of incompetence. 
In this case, business expertise is not encoded within a well organized profession or 
within a rigorous program of higher education, but within the ideology 
legitimating the economic systems of the Western world. The program in the 
transmission of business expertise that we have analyzed in this paper must also 
be understood as one based on a capitalist mission. Capitalist missionaries are 
bringing a superior culture of business to a world of Polish entrepreneurs eager to 
acquire the knowledge of the advanced. That these experts come from the USA, a 
society whose culture is in general positively valued by Poles, makes their 
missionary work all the more plausible. 
This missionary work, however, does not have the same broad ambition of 
the missionary work of the Peace Corps, or even that of religious missionaries 
eager to convert whole communities to their religion. This capitalist missionary 
work is designed only to convert, or rather empower, a few. Only those with the 
entrepreneurial spirit, whom most of our experts consider to be a distinct minority, 
have the capacity to absorb the wisdom our experts have to offer. And only if the 
newly empowered entrepreneurial class adopts the larger faith of capitalist 
ideology with which this missionary work is associated is it possible to imagine 
them solving the problems of post-communist capitalism. But even this larger 
ideology shows its strains before the contradictions of post-communist capitalism. 
The interns are skeptical about the short term viability of the post- 
communist transition. The are not skeptical because there aren't entrepreneurs, 
or because the entrepreneurs can't learn a new and appropriate mindset. They 
are skeptical because the Polish government is insufficiently supportive of the 
capitalist turn. And one reason this government is i n ~ ~ c i e n t l y  supportive of 
that turn is because it is to some degree beholden to the larger society which is far 
less capitalist in its faith than its elites or its entrepreneurs. 
For post-communist capitalism to develop in the way our experts want, the 
post-communist government must not act according to the expressed wishes of the 
majority of its demos, but rather it must convince the majority that it should act 
according to the advice of experts who come from a land where the good life 
reigns. The majority must trust the elite to govern according to its better sense of 
what is necessary. That trust can only be derived from the faith that what exists 
in the home of the Western expert can be imported to post-communist capitalism. 
Faith is not a metaphor in this instance, but rather central to the missionary role 
this transmission of expertise demands. I t  is on the basis of this faith that 
Western experts and Polish entrepreneurs claim leadership in the making of post- 
communist capitalism. 
As Bialecki and Mach show, the trust of the majority in the leadership of 
this minority has already declined, and likely will continue to decline as the gap 
between the faith and the reality fails to close. Post-communist democracies will 
likely become less able to implement shock therapy to induce capitalism. Western 
experts will become less appreciated as capitalist missionaries, and more may 
consider them cultural imperialists. Instead of more post-communist capitalism, 
there may be more post-communist class conflict. Aid focused on making a post- 
communist entrepreneurial class will have strengthened one side in this conflict, 
but it does not necessarily make the viability of post-communist capitalism more 
likely. Instead, perhaps, new models of a politically viable, compromise-based, 
post-communist economy may emerge as the ideology of Western capitalism and 
its missionaries gives way to the imagination of Polish post-communism and its 
citizens. 
TABLE 1: MBA Internship Appointments for 1990 Through 1992 
# of # of.Intern 
Ownershiv Emvlovees Firm T m e  Citv Avvointments 
State <50 . Privatization of enterprises Warsaw 2.0 
Private <50 Consulting warsaw 2.0 
State <2500 ~anufacturing/Transportation equipmentKrakow 1.0 
Private <50 . Consulting - Gdansk 2.0 
Private <lo0 Computer sales & distribution Krakow 1.0 






























Private <2 0 
Private <50 
Private <200 
~onsulting/Chocolate Fact./Wool Proc. Krakow 1.0 
~anufacturing/Circuit Boards krakow 1.0 
- Manufacturing/Transportation equipmentKrakow 0.5 
Steel Production Krakow 0.5. 
Bank Wroclaw 1.0 
Computer Software Gdansk 0.3 
Bank Szczecin 1.3 
Computer sales & distribution Krakow 1.0 
Financial consulting Lodz 1.0 
Consulting Gdansk 1.0 
Bank Gdansk 1.3 
Department Store Bytom 1.0 
Privatizing state enterprises Warsaw 1.0 
.. . 
1992 
Bank Szczecin 2.0 
Consulting Gdansk 1.0 
Bank Gdansk 1.0 
Commercial real-estate development Warsaw 1.0 
Privatizing state enterprises Warsaw 2.0 
Arts management Warsaw 1.0 . . . 
Manufacturing spark plugs Kielce 2.0 
Krakow 2.0 . . Computer sales & distribution 
Construction management Krakow 1.. 0 
Jesuit publishing Krakow 1.0 
Education/School of Public Krakow 1.0 
consulting & Advertising Katowice 1.0 
Consulting & Leasing Katowice ' 1.0 
Marketing Warsaw 1.0 
Bank Wroclaw 1.0 
Construction manufacturing Bielsko-Bialal.0 
Publishing Wroclaw 1.0 
Financial consulting Lodz 1.0 
Insurance Sopot 1.0 
* "Transition" describes those enterprises which are in the process of privatizing. As 
this process often involves substantial restructuring and streamlining of staff, it is 
nearly impossible to present a figure which accurately represents the size of some 
privatizing companies, depending upon how far along they are in their transition. 

